The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation

Amazon.com

Human life, scientific journalist Matt Ridley suggests, is a complex balancing act: we behave with self-interest foremost in mind, but also in ways that do not harm, and sometimes even benefit, others. This behavior, in a strange way, makes us good. It also makes us unique in the animal world, where self-interest is far more pronounced. "The essential virtuousness of human beings is proved not by parallels in the animal kingdom, but by the very lack of convincing animal parallels," Ridley writes. How we got to be so virtuous over millions of years of evolution is the theme of this entertaining book of popular science, which will be of interest to any student of human nature.

Book Description

If, as Darwin suggests, evolution relentlessly encourages the survival of the fittest, why are humans compelled to live in cooperative, complex societies? In this fascinating examination of the roots of human trust and virtue, a zoologist and former American editor of the Economist reveals the results of recent studies that suggest that self-interest and mutual aid are not at all incompatible. In fact, he points out, our cooperative instincts may have evolved as part of mankind's natural selfish behavior--by exchanging favors we can benefit ourselves as well as others. Brilliantly orchestrating the newest findings of geneticists, psychologists, and anthropologists, The Origins of Virtue re-examines the everyday assumptions upon which we base our actions towards others, whether in our roles as parents, siblings, or trade partners. With the wit and brilliance of The Red Queen, his acclaimed study of human and animal sexuality, Matt Ridley shows us how breakthroughs in computer programming, microbiology, and economics have given us a new perspective on how and why we relate to each other.

• Ridley's previous book, The Red Queen, was short-listed for the Writers' Guild Award for nonfiction.

Customer Reviews:

The Greatest Book Ever Written.......2007-09-11

Don't pick up this book unless you want life-changing revelations about the way you view friends, family, and all other relationships. Everything is a give and take.

Interesting book about cooperative behavior, marred by libertarian bias.......2007-05-06

Why should people or animals be nice to one another? The thesis of the book is that such behavior arises because it is in the mutual interest of individuals to exchange goods and services. The book does a good job of showing examples from animal and anthropological studies as well as providing theoretical arguments. Along the way you will be disabused of any notions that you may have of "noble savages" and of any idyllic images of the behavior of dolphins and chimpanzees.

Unfortunately the author has a dislike of large scale government, which causes him to ignore investigating the benefits not only of government but of special purpose organizations at all levels from gardening clubs to Medieval guilds to large scale charitable organizations. There are, for example, things that governments do well that simply are not possible at the individual level, like organizing poice and armies and constructing highways. Also worthy of mention would be the comparatively modern concept of voting. This is not something done by hunter-gatherers, because they do not have the required abstract concept of number, which is not something that we are born with.

Despite its title the book does not really explain the origin of virtue as a concept. He says that the ideal of self-less behavior is an illusion, yet even if this is the case it requires an explanation. Why are we moved by the suffering of others? Why do so many people contribute to charitable organizations? Why do we have a concept of justice, leading to what the author calls the "irrational" attitude of revenge, which he notes is peculiar to our own species.

The book provides a good starting point for a discussion of virtue, but, as I have indicated it is certainly not the final word on the subject.

Interesting argument about human cooperation and evolution.......2007-03-19

The book opens with a daring jail break. The story notes that the person escaping the grim Russian prison is, in fact, a member of the nobility, one of the Czar's favorites when the escapee was much younger. The person breaking out, of course, is Peter Kropotkin, the anarchist prince. However, it is not his philosophy so much as his work in natural history that drew Matt Ridley's attention.

Kropotkin, on an exploration of Siberia, observed what he saw was cooperation among multitudinous animal species. He drew from that the conclusion that Huxley, who had described nature as "red in tooth and claw," was missing an important part of the evolution picture--the evolution of cooperation. And this leads to Ridley's thesis in this well written volume (page 5): "Society works not because we have consciously invented it, but because it is an ancient product of our evolved predispositions. It is literally in our nature." He goes on to note that (page 5): "This is a book about human nature, and in particular the surprisingly social nature of the human animal."

The volume proceeds by reviewing theories and research on cooperation, evolution, and so on, a wide ranging review of the human condition and of our evolutionary impulses. He notes that our primate relatives set the stage for understanding the evolution of human cooperation. He notes the importance of a game, adopting game theory, developed by political scientist Robert Axelrod, in which humans will cooperate unless double crossed, at which point individuals will respond in negative kind. But, according to some theorists, as long as individuals are willing to cooperate with one another, they will get cooperation in return.

His conclusion is intriguing (page 264): "If we are to recover social harmony and virtue, if we are to build back into society the virtues that made it work for us, it is vital that we reduce the power and scope of the state." He calls for (page 265) ". . .social and material exchange between equals for that is the raw material of trust, and trust is the basis for virtue."

All in all, an intriguing and interesting volume. Not all, of course, will be convinced of the thesis. But it is a well written effort to integrate many different bodies of work to make his point.

Provocative with some confusing conclusions.......2007-01-10

I gave this book four stars out of five because most of the book seems to develop a sound argument for virtues and traits arising out of evolutionary development. Where it fails is in some of its conclusions. Here I am echoing the Editorial Review From Library Journal as shown here on Amazon.com. After pointing out how mankind, many times as hunter-gather tribes, has caused massive destruction and drove many species to extinction, he concludes that the best way to be environmentally friendly is through small, local cooperatives rather than large, especially state sponsored or directed, environmental organizations. (He arrives at other similar conclusions in other areas as well). This seems to be a dichotomy. While he does provide some evidence, it is not nearly as conclusive as he seems to believe. At one point he speaks of the English medieval common. He points out that stinting is still an on-going practice in some regions, thus leading to the conclusion that local control and cooperation is best. However, this argument leaves a lot to be desired. First, the commons system mostly broke down for a variety of reasons, one of which was cheating. This lead to the enclosures. This ended up leading to wealthier individuals who ended up purchasing more property and reducing his neighbors to fuedal status and eventual poor management. If the commons system was so successful, it is hard to understand why it almost completely collapsed. To be sure, the collapse can be partially explained to some degree by other aspects of human nature. Yet, a truly successful system should have been able to resist such corruption.

Likewise, the attacks on the larger "do good" organizations seems questionable. After all, it has been a defining nature of man to organize in ever larger groups for at least 10,000 years, the time of the earliest known permanent settlements. While 10,000 years is a mere blip on the evolutionary scale, the need to organize seems pervasive, as he points out early on using the complex systems of plants and animals as examples. While the frailties of human nature do not always lead these organizations to performing the best good, it is unquestionable that many people involved in these organizations are selfless. Also, another counter-argument to his conclusions is the fact that much of the Industrial world democratically votes for things that will cost them, but are for some sort of larger good.

What this book does well is demonstrate that many virtuous traits did come out of evolutionary development, rather than cultural or religious forces. While these latter undoubtedly have an effect on these traits, they are not the source. It does a good job explaining what the base behavioral tendencies are, thus providing a basis for evaluating our institutions, finding ways to reward positive traits and to punish the negative traits that always arise.

This book is an easy read. If the subject is interesting to you, purchase the book, just keep on mind some of the weaknesses. A newer book you may want to consider is Moral Minds. Or, perhaps, read both.

Very entertaining.......2006-11-21

Matt Ridley does a good job of explaining the origins of virtue as pro-social, instinctive behaviors that serve individual or genetic self-interest via a cohesive and cooperative group. The flip-side of this is tribal 'us' vs 'them' thinking and behavior which can lead to the horrors of war and genocide.

Free-trade is seen as the way to improve relations between groups. Reduced state power with private or communal property ownership is seen as the way to improve conservation of resources and to improve relations between people who are then equally engaged in exchange. Exchange is built on trust which is the foundation of virtue.

Ridley acknowledges the problem that the recognition of the motivation of self-interest in people can lead to people becoming more selfish.

My greater concern is his assumption of exchange being between equals. Or, indeed, how decision-making power will be shared equally considering, for example, how much authority men have had over women throughout evolution and history. Can women be equal exchangers considering their reproductive and 'caring' roles in society that are so difficult to cost or even for men to value? Ridley himself says that tribalism is more of a male problem so is this all really just directed at men and traditional male activities? If so, where does it leave women, children, the elderly etc? The practicalities are far from clear.

Nonetheless, this is a strong argument and Ridley is a very entertaining writer. Certainly well worth reading.

Average customer rating:

Extended edition IS NOT EXTENDED!!!!
Reconciling Individual Interest with Collective Interest
The evolution is just beginning
How mutual hostility can evolve into cooperation.
Be good, be fair and forgive

The Evolution of Cooperation
Robert Axelrod
Manufacturer: Perseus Books Group
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0465005640

Book Description

Updated for the first time, the classic book on why cooperation is not only natural but also the best survival strategy

The Evolution of Cooperation addresses a simple yet age-old question: If living things evolve through competition, how can cooperation ever emerge? Despite the abundant evidence of cooperation all around us, there existed no purely naturalistic answer to this question until 1979, when Robert Axelrod famously ran a computer tournament featuring a standard game-theory exercise called The Prisoner's Dilemma. To everyone's surprise, the program that won the tournament, named Tit for Tat, was not only the simplest but the most "cooperative" entrant. This unexpected victory proved that cooperation--one might even say altruism--is mathematically possible and therefore needs no hidden hand or divine agent to create and sustain it. A great roadblock to the understanding of all sorts of behavior was at last removed. The updated edition includes an extensive new chapter on cooperation in cancer cells and among terrorist organizations.

"This book, if read, grasped and applied, could have a profound effect." (Wall Street Journal)

"A fascinating, provocative, and important book." (Douglas R. Hofstadter, author of Godel, Escher, Bach)

Customer Reviews:

Extended edition IS NOT EXTENDED!!!!.......2007-04-26

"The updated edition includes an extensive new chapter on cooperation in cancer cells and among terrorist organizations."

WHAT?? I bought this, with the new preface and cover, and it DID NOT CONTAIN NEW MATERIAL IN THE BOOK. I wrote the published, and THEY DID NOT REPLY. Crappers.

Reconciling Individual Interest with Collective Interest.......2005-12-10

The goal of a model is to explain complex reality with parsimony. This means that a model is a simplification of reality or approximation to some aspect of our world. Likewise, the goal of game-model is also to explain reality by abstracting the important features of reality for a particular problem.

Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game has represented the reconstructed reality of international politics without overriding or overarching government authority, because it does not only explain persuasively why states have suffered from the problem of non-cooperation, but also show what states should do in international anarchy.

In PD game, the more self-interest each player pursues, the more collective interest both players lose. Nevertheless, they can not stop pursuing their self-interests. Otherwise, they will be faced to the worst case. As a result, all of players do not escape from social inefficiency and eternal conflict.

Hobbes, who described human existence in the state-of-nature as Bellum omnium contra omnes, suggested Leviathan as the solution to the dilemma. However, in that states exist in "international" anarchy, the argument is meaningless. If Hobbesian state-of-nature is the reality among nations, the world is in a constant state of war.

Axelrod finds the new puzzle in here: In situations where each individual has an incentive to be selfish, how can cooperation ever develop? His goal is to explain the cooperation under anarchy. To do so, he designs a variation of PD game with R > (T+S) / 2 value and introduces the concept of time. His explanation depends on the iterated PD game (IPD) where players do not know which is the final move.

Achieving socially efficient or Pareto-superior mutual cooperation in PD game is possible if the reciprocity works as times go by and the players consider the future consequences of their present actions with foresight (the reciprocity is emphasized much more than foresight). Especially, Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy and the Shadow of Future play a core role in explaining cooperation.

First of all, he sets five preconditions for IPD: (1) players cannot make any threat or prior commitment (2) there is no knowledge of the other players¡¦ upcoming move, as each game is simultaneous (3) the interaction among players can not be avoided (4) there is no way to change the other player's payoffs (5) the only communication allowed is through the player's own prior behavior.

Also, the concept of a discount parameter, w, which represents the degree to which the payoffs of each move are discounted relative to the previous move, is introduced. Thus, w is the weight of the next move in the future. As times go by, value tends to decrease in negative squares.

This can be represented as the sum of infinite series. The higher the value of w, the more likely the players will meet in the future. Contrarily, since 0
From this setting, Proposition (1) is derived: If the discount parameter, w is sufficiently high, there is no best strategy independent of the strategy used by the other player.

Also, Axelrod runs two computer tournaments by inviting the top game theorists, and reports that Rapoport¡¦s TFT was the best strategy. Although 15 programs in 1st tournament & 63 programs in 2nd tournament were submitted, TFT won all of them. TFT got the average score of 504.5 in 1st round & the score of 434.73 in 2nd round. Why?

He divides the reasons into 4: (1) TFT avoids unnecessary conflict by cooperating as long as the other player cooperates; this is being nice and never being the first to defect (2) TFT has no hesitation in retaliating in the face of the other's defection; that is, TFT does not wait to see if the defection was a mistake, as defection is to be punished immediately.

(3) TFT is open to forgiveness after responding to a provocation; in this way, a TFT player do not wait to reward cooperation (4) TFT has the clarity of behavior, so that the other player can adapt to TFT pattern more easily than others (TFT program length was the shortest). Thus, TFT could do well over a wide range of environments, against both nice and defection strategies.

Next, the stability of cooperation based upon TFT is discussed. He explores the relationship between a native population uniform strategy & a newcomer strategy. He assumes the existence of a native population employing strategy B & a newcomer using strategy A.

If the players interact with each other one at a time, the expected utility of the newcomer with A might be higher than the expected utility of one of the native population. In that case, A is said to invade B.

Otherwise, B is said to be collectively stable. When p is the frequency of a newcomer interacting with other newcomers, the condition of invasion by newcomers is:

(p)*EU(newcomer|newcomer)+(1-p)*EU(newcomer|native)>EU(native|native)

If p is between 0 & 1, newcomers¡¦ strategies can invade the strategy of the native population and vice versa. So, can TFT invade All D? Can All D invade TFT? Assume w = 0.9.

(p)*EU(TFT|TFT)+(1-p)*EU(TFT|All D)>EU(All D| All D)
(p)*[R/(1-w)]+(1-p)*[S+(w*P)/(1-w)]>P/(1-w)
(p)*[3/(1-0.9)]+(1-p)*[0+0.9*1/(1-0.9)]>[1/(1-0.9)]
(p)*(30)+(1-p)*(9)>10
21p+9>10
21p>1
p>1/21

(p)*EU(All D|All D)+(1-p)*EU(All D|TFT)>EU(TFT|TFT)
(p)*[P/(1-w)]+(1-p)*[T+(w*P)/(1-w)]>R/(1-w)
(p)*[1/(1-0.9)]+(1-p)*[5+0.9*1/(1-0.9)]>[3/(1-0.9]
(p)*(10)+(1-p)*(14)>30
10p+14¡V14p>30
10p+14-14p>30
-4p+14>30
-4p>16
p <-4

Thus, when the shadow of future is very strong (w = 0.9), TFT can invade All D if there is more than 1 TFT invader for every 21 All D natives. It takes so few. Also, All D cannot invade TFT when w is sufficiently high (strictly speaking, the critical value of w for TFT to be collectively stable is 2/3).

From this, he derives additional 6 Propositions. The most interesting one among them is Proposition (6)The strategies which can invade All D in a cluster with the smallest value of p are those which are maximally discriminating, such as TFT. This means that cooperation is possible even in the world of All D, as long as small clusters of discriminating invaders with TFT have a small proportion of interactions in the Hobbes state-of-nature.

More interestingly, he shows that cooperation could emerge even without friendship. Let-and-Let-Live system (i.e., the static nature of trench warfare) might be considered as the prototype that small TFT interactions invaded the strategy of All D native population on war. However, Axelrod also mentions that the stability of cooperation based upon the reciprocity can be impaired by (1) the rotation of troops (2) the artillery less dependent on reciprocity for its life than infantry in trench (3) the raids.

However, pointing out that Chapter 4 is about interaction among human beings who can evaluate the reciprocity and respond to it rationally, he argues that such understanding by the participants is not really necessary for cooperation to emerge and prove stable.

Therefore, he argues that (1) cooperation is possible without morality or foresight as shown in the relationship between crocodiles and crocodile birds (2) the patterns of unconscious responsiveness of bacteria or organism might lead to the cooperation based upon the reciprocity (3) the evolutionary process depends upon individual advantage (not benefits to whole group), which unintentionally leads to the cooperation based upon the reciprocity.

In addition, he suggests four advices on how to choose effectively under a given strategic setting: (1) Do not be envious; TFT never wins head to head, so players must realize that an IPD is not a zero-sum game (2) Do not be the first to defect so long as the future remains important, based on Proposition 1 (3) Reciprocate cooperation and defection but begin with cooperation (4) Do not be too clever; be clear about your strategy so others can figure out what you are doing. Again, TFT is the strategy which satisfies all of the advices.

Especially, five ways on how to promote cooperation is discussed in aspect of changing the strategic setting: (1) Enlarge the Shadow of the Future by making the interactions more durable and more frequent (2) Change the payoffs; The change of payoffs determines the incentives of behavior (3) Teach people to care about each other (4) Teach reciprocity; Do not forget the negative effect of All C that might spoil the other players (5) Improve recognition abilities; Accumulate the credibility of reciprocity through good history of interactions.

Finally, the social structure of cooperation is discussed. The social structure influences on how the evolution of cooperation can begin. The influence might constrain or facilitate cooperation, or make the evolutionary process of cooperation dynamic. Namely, the relationship between the social structure and the cooperation in IPD can be understood as being equal to the relationship between the culture and the institution.

As the institutional performance depends largely upon culture, so the speed and the range of the evolution of cooperation is determined greatly by the social structure such as labels, reputation, regulation, and territoriality. Fist, labels (i.e., stereotype) might decrease the importance of the benefits due to mutual cooperation. This is related closely to the debates on the distributional effect of collective interest.

Second, the importance of reputation as a bully might delay the speed of cooperation. Third, relating to regulation, the government in here is not Leviathan, but a player interacting with the governed on compliance and flexibility. In this case, the efficiency of the exchange of flexibility with compliance determines the evolutionary process of cooperation among them.

Finally, in that the territorial system (i.e., positional picture) influences the way the players interact with each other which determines the course of the evolutionary process, territoriality as the social structure matters.

Axelrod concludes: (1) Cooperation has staying power but the biggest problem is getting cooperation started (2) Ratchet effect: Cooperation is successful incrementally, as clusters of cooperation build upon clusters cooperation (3) Cooperation is a rational possibility, even without a central authority, as long as the future is sufficiently important (4) Reconciling individual interest with collective interest is possible by TFT.

Recently, Fearon (1995), Morrow (1999) and Powell (2005) argue that one of the reasons why the Pareto-inferior outcomes such as ex post costly wars have recurred is due to the commitment problem. Morrow (1999: 92) maintains, Commitment is a problem when actors' incentives change over time.

Although Axelrod and they consider the concept of time seriously, their conclusions are totally different. While they focus on explaining the cause of war in PD (i.e., In PD, one player's commitment to C can not be believed by other player), his interest is placed on explaining the cause of cooperation in PD (i.e., what matters in PD, is not unilateral commitment, but mutual learning effect by TFT).

However, Axelrod seems to be superior to them, because he might explain both war and cooperation with the level of w. But, Fearon, Morrow, and Powell might suffer from selection bias, because the commitment problem explains only wars.

References

Axelrod, Robert (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books.

Fearon, James D (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization 49 (3): 379-414.

Morrow, James D (1999). The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics. In Strategic Choice and International Relations, ed. David A. Lake and Robert Powell. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 77-114.

Poundstone, William (1992). Prisoners' Dilemma. Anchor Book.

Powell, Robert (2005). War as a Commitment Problem. International Organization (forthcoming)

The evolution is just beginning.......2005-09-10

Amidst the glowing 5-star reviews I feel the need to interject some concerns and outright criticisms of this book, although I do recommend its reading. Certainly the book provides a relatively good starting point in a very complex area, but it should not be construed as the final word on a much more complex subject. I do think that R. Axelrod provides an excellent, if at times overbearing, presentation of how game theory, specifically in the realm of an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) scenrario, can explain a number of historical as well as daily situations. He goes on to expound on some good generalizations on how people might act to inspire more cooperation and these generalizations, if implemented by people (groups, governments, etc.), might result in a more cooperative world. For this, there are good things to say. But I would caution not to create from this any utopian potential for the real world.

The `winning strategy' of TIT FOR TAT (TFT) works because it starts out `nice' but it retaliates immediately if someone else does not `play nice', too. So this is not vision of world cooperation. It is a realistic vision of maximizing cooperation under specific conditions which he covers relatively well towards the later chapters. Ultimately, the natural take away is a hopeful view of a potentially more cooperative environment, with perhaps a bit of forgetting that unkind retaliation is an integral part of his winning `cooperative' strategy.

Here are some aspects which Mr. Axelrod alludes to but somewhat minimizes, in my opinion, in their impact on TFT's potential for success in real world interactions:

a) The IPD strategies, which were submitted by experts from around the world, were submitted to computerized testing to determine which strategies `win' the most. This is based on an established point system that awards different points for different actions by two players. (This is summarized in one review already, so I will not repeat it here.) While this makes the playing of the game easy and consistent, it does not reflect the real world conditions which often exist. For example, if, in one turn, one player `defects' and the other `cooperates', the point system says the defector `wins' 5 points and the cooperator gets nothing. Are all defections `equal' in the real world? Or are some interactions far more important than others, so therefore cooperating on small things but defecting on bigger things might result in different outcomes than would ever be accounted for in the point systems used in these studies? Intuitively, a major defection may have far more significance (i.e. point value) than a minor one, but to accomplish his analysis, Axelrod's point structure is always the same.
b) Related to the above, are all joint cooperative efforts or joint defections `equal' as implied by the point values? (When two strategies cooperate, each is awarded 3 points. When each defect, they each get 1.) At the time this book was being published, an interesting `real world' example was playing out which would question this very assumption. At that time, Reagan was building up the military and the Soviet Union was `matching' the build up. You can either view this as mutual defection or mutual cooperation, depending upon whether you view cooperation as always a `positive' thing. In any event, the results of these mutual actions were NOT equal. The US had far more resources to invest in the game so each time `points' were awarded, the US actually gained more than the Soviets who eventually had to stop playing. Consistent point values simply do not account for this, unless one wants to interject additional elements not presented in Axelrod's work.
c) Related to point b), the IPD study presents things from a vantage point that each actor starts out from an equal footing and therefore the only functional question is whether one strategy consistently wins in such a way as to keep near the top of the point standings. In reality, rarely does any person or group begin interaction on an equal footing. What I am trying to raise is not the same as his discussions in Chapters 8 and 9 on the strength and growth of various strategies in a world starting out with many different strategies. In those scenarios, some strategies die out because they stop having sources of points to take from others. But what if each strategy starts out from an unequal basis, some having significantly more `capital' to expend and coupling this to a more realistic scenario where each interaction is not free, but each has a cost to the participant (somewhat like putting your bet down before you play poker - you may win or lose, but if you lose your position is not the same as when you started, it is less than when you started). In such a scenario, which is more realistic in terms of how companies, governments and even people interact, the results would be materially different. So the starting premise of Axelrod's IPD scenario and point schemes may be so well constructed as to make for interesting descriptions of some specific and even common interactions, but it may be too well constructed to be able to be extrapolated to many more complex situations.
d) Another weakness is the assumption that all defections are of the same magnitude. If, in an otherwise nice political campaign (ever seen one of those?) a small, third party candidate launches an attack ad and the attacked major party retaliates, is the retaliation equal? Or, again, does their starting point allow them to annihilate the attacker? (Since I have never seen a positive political campaign, you can interject any other similar scenario which might actually come up in real life!) The `equal points for equal actions' premise is inherently flawed. Yet this is the basis of much of the book's conclusions.
e) What is the end result of a universe where everyone uses a TFT strategy? This is only marginally considered, at best. While the issue had been in my mind throughout much of the book, it was not until fairly late that Axelrod makes clear, albeit briefly, that in any set of two player interactions, TFT will at best result in the same total number of points as the other player and, for a number of reasons, probably slightly less. In other words, the person, company, group or government using a pure TFT strategy must be happy being close to the best in whatever the interaction. Personally, I am fine with that, thank you! But to assume that everyone is and that nobody will come up with a disruptive strategy that, perhaps only for a time, garners more points but winds up putting them on top of the heap in whatever competition may be in play. If the end game is the Superbowl, being second is not gratifying. Ask Philadelphia.
f) Finally, I found some of the descriptors attached to the strategies interesting, especially in light of Axelrod's ending recommendations on cooperation. Some strategies which attempted to use planned defection as part of their strategy were labeled as `meanies' while other strategies that started their initial moves with cooperation were labeled as `nice'. I find it interesting that a `scientist' would use such descriptors to classify things given that they bring with them connotations. Even TFT could be construed as a `meanie' since one of its logical outcomes is that it cooperates once, and once only, only to defect from then on based on the other parties action. Are all non-cooperative interactions except one inherently more `nice'? This is not important in the scope of my real concerns, but I always sense a red flag rising when an otherwise objective presentation resorts to affect-linked labels to make part of its case.

All of the above is NOT to imply that I think Axelrod's work is wrong and should be thrown out. I simply felt that, unlike the rest of the glowing reviews, Axelrod's work does not go far enough and leaves some gaping holes yet to be explored. Read this book, but keep your eyes and mind open for the flaws which seem to be thinly covered with papier-mâché.

How mutual hostility can evolve into cooperation........2005-03-01

Without question, the case studies in this book have applications in biology, sociology, international relations, economics and business. The basic question put forward is, "How is it possible, that in an environment of mutual hostility where acting selfishly will lead to gain against your opponent(s), cooperative behavior between the antagonists will emerge and become the dominant long-term behavior?" It turns out that it is easy to see how such behavior can emerge, even in hostile battlefield conditions. In fact, cooperative behavior has distinct evolutionary advantages.
The solution is found within game theory, in particular the situation known as the Prisoner's Dilemma. Two people, (one and two), who jointly committed a crime are arrested for the crime and placed in separate rooms where they cannot communicate. The police interrogate him or her separately and offer each individual a deal. If they defect and testify against their comrade, they will be given a reduced sentence. In this situation, there are four possible outcomes:

1) Neither defects - both go free, each is considered to have earned a positive reward.
2) One defects and two does not - one is set free and two serves a long sentence.
3) Two defects and one does not - two is set free and one serves a long sentence.
4) One and two both defect - each serve a reduced sentence.

In the problem, reward values are assigned to the results, and typical values are

1) Both one and two are both assigned a value of +3.
2) One is assigned a value of +3 and two the value of -5.
3) Two is assigned a value of +3 and one the value of -5.
4) One and two are both assigned a value of -1.

It is clear that each prisoner wants to avoid the situation where they are the only one who serves time in jail. Therefore, if this event will only occur once, then option four will be the result and cooperation will not take place.
However, if both prisoners have the potential for a future relationship, where that relationship has the real potential for rewards for cooperation and punishments for defecting, then option one can emerge. The best demonstration of this is what took place in some sectors of the western front in the First World War. When the same units faced each other for extended periods of time, a live and let live policy emerged on both sides. Each side adopted a strategy of not engaging in lethal force, unless the other side did. When required to expend artillery ammunition to demonstrate aggressiveness to superiors, they would shoot the same target at the same time of the day. Since their firing was predictable, soldiers on the other side would know to avoid that area and in fact would often climb out of their trench to observe the explosions.
There were instances where German snipers would demonstrate their prowess by continuing to hit the same position on a wall until they made a hole. Therefore, even though superiors admonished the soldiers to continue to kill the enemy and both sides had the capability, the fact that they had a lengthy relationship allowed the cooperation to occur. These phenomena did not take place in regions where units did not face each other for extended periods.
The first chapter describes tournaments, where computer programs competed against each other by defecting or cooperating and the scoring is similar to that of the Prisoner's Dilemma already mentioned. What emerged as the most successful tactic, even when the results of the first round were incorporated into the second round, is the TIT FOR TAT. This strategy is very simple, cooperate in the first round and for each successive round, do what the opponent did in the previous one.
I was fascinated by these results and it was easy to see the obvious implications for relationships of all types. For cooperation to occur, all that is necessary is that there be the expectation of a continued relationship and the potential for future rewards/penalties. What makes it especially interesting is that no appeal to morality, ethics or any other abstract concept need be made. The behavior occurs as a consequence of an increase in the long-term gain for all parties.

Published in Journal of Recreational Mathematics, reprinted with permission.

Be good, be fair and forgive.......2005-02-16

A mathematical tale of how, if cooperation can benefit parties (which it very often does), the most profitable behaviour is initial trust (offer a hand), mirroring reciprocity (good for good, bad for bad), total forgiveness (only account for the last move) and lack of any further cleverness, calculations or speculations.
The most amazing results are that, if behaving this way in a minimally stable environment, you never benefit more than your counterpart while you always benefit most overall, that you systematically promote total cooperation, that a few pioneers can teach large groups of non-cooperative bullies and that this behaviour beautifully resists aggression.
The work of Robert Axelrod is amazing in its transparency and applicability, and enlightening in its hopeful conclusions. Thumbs up.

Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life (Economic Learning and Social Evolution)

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Well written, easy to read, informative
An eclectic collection of great essays
Fairness and Sociability

Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life (Economic Learning and Social Evolution)

Manufacturer: The MIT Press
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Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0262572370

Book Description

Moral Sentiments and Material Interests presents an innovative synthesis of research in different disciplines to argue that cooperation stems not from the stereotypical selfish agent acting out of disguised self-interest but from the presence of "strong reciprocators" in a social group.

Presenting an overview of research in economics, anthropology, evolutionary and human biology, social psychology, and sociology, the book deals with both the theoretical foundations and the policy implications of this explanation for cooperation. Chapter authors in the remaining parts of the book discuss the behavioral ecology of cooperation in humans and nonhuman primates, modeling and testing strong reciprocity in economic scenarios, and reciprocity and social policy. The evidence for strong reciprocity in the book includes experiments using the famous Ultimatum Game (in which two players must agree on how to split a certain amount of money or they both get nothing.)

Customer Reviews:

Well written, easy to read, informative.......2007-09-19

Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life (Economic Learning and Social Evolution) combinds the theory of cultural evolution ala Boyd and Richerson (and Henrich et al) and the behavioral economy by people like Gintis, Bowles and Fehr. The book works further based on the theory - develops e.g. models for a better social policy etc.

Book discusses an issue which is very central for "being a human being" - co-operation. Book is very informative, very well written even if there are many writers with heterogenous background. Also after the book you kind of get more optimistic about the prospects of humananity.

I am without any formal education in antropology, biology and economics but have read "everything" by Boyd and Richerson - my understanding on economics is based on Microeconomics by Samuel Bowles.

The book was to me a good further reading after the Bowles Microeconomics book. But the book can be read even by someone who does not know about economics even that much as me. The book is not too formal - easy to read actually.

An eclectic collection of great essays.......2007-06-08

This book is just really great. The literature on fairness and reciprocity in social science is growing fast, and this book is ideal to give you a flavour of why this is such a good thing. It is diverse, with entries ranging from biological models that attempt to explain the evolution of reciprocity, through the implications of reciprocity for the way legal sanctions work, to the political philosophy of the dark side of clan mentality.
Most readers will probably not want to read everything, and even less people will agree with everything. One needs to remember that a lot of the stuff in this book is still controversial, including the existence of (strong) reciprocity, but this is what makes it so very interesting. And if only half of what's in this book is right, it is still revolutionary.
In 10 years, this book will be terribly outdated. But for now, it is the best thing you can get if you are interested in the interplay between evolution, reciprocity and social order, and the fundamental questions of social science that it entails.

Fairness and Sociability.......2006-05-08

For several years now, a group of social scientists has been studying the human tendency to be socially fair rather than narrowly selfish. The editors of this volume--Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, and Ernst Fehr--are among the stalwarts; others are found among the authors of the book's chapters.
The core of this long-running effort is Fehr's experiments with the ultimatum game, in which two people must share a sum of money (say, $10); Person A gets to propose a split, Person B can only accept or decline. Economists and politicians would expect every game to wind up with a $9.99/$0.01 split (or actually a 9-1 split, since bills are used), but in fact typical splits are more like 5-5 or 6-4, and in one place (Lamalera, Indonesia) people actually split something like 4-6, few A's ever claiming even half the money. This long-running set of experiments around the world adds to a vast, rapidly accumulating set of data showing that people are sociable, not "rational" in the folk-economic sense (i.e., dedicated solely to narrow material self-interest). The present book discusses the implications for economics and politics. If people are naturally concerned with fairness, narrowly economistic policies can be counterproductive; we all know cases of "crowding out," in which a material incentive actually makes people act worse, by crowding out moral incentives. If you reward people for being good, they will think it's all a cynical game, and will act worse. Punitive legislation to make people do what they do anyway (for moral reasons) is also counterproductive. Imagine what these realizations would do to American social policy.
The problem with this book is that it is too optimistic and upbeat. The downside of human sociability is confined to one page, late in the book (p. 388), where racism, honor killing, and the like get a quick mention. Alas, the morning radio brings a stream of accounts not only of such things but also of religious butchery all over the world--Christians, Muslims, Hindus, and even Buddhists (theoretically prohibited from killing but busily genocidal). This brings us back to Adam Smith's suggestion that greed may not be lovable but may be better than the noble, virtuous alternatives. I hope Gintis et al work on how to decouple fairness and interpersonal concern from the desire to exterminate everybody who is not in one's immediate social set. Until this is done, the hope purveyed in this work will remain thin.
The authors note that humans seem genetically programmed to have at least some sense of fairness and of self-sacrifice for the common good, but they wisely refrain from trying to unpack "hereditary" and "environmental" or "cultural" aspects. Heredity makes us do this, and learn it easily, and heredity gives us the ability to learn and develop cultures. No way to unpack. Still, more needs to be done on just how flexible these inborn moralities are. The range from Lamalera to certain parts of South America is pretty great. So is the range of murderousness in religious and ethnic settings. We need to know how to modify human behavior in these regards, and how much we can hope for.
That being said, this book is the best yet in the long list of books that devastate the selfish-individualist model of human behavior. People desperately want to be sociable, and be good members of their society. This may lead them to fairness and generosity, or to body-piercing, or to suicide bombing. This book offers hope for building new societies through use of innate human decency. At this point in time, any book seriously offering such hope is desirable.

Cooperation in Primates and Humans: Mechanisms and Evolution

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Definitive State of the Art Analysis

Cooperation in Primates and Humans: Mechanisms and Evolution
Peter M., Ed. Kappeler
Manufacturer: Springer
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ASIN: 3540283749

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Cooperative behavior has been one of the enigmas of evolutionary theory since the days of Charles Darwin. The contributions to this book examine the many facets of cooperative behavior in primates and humans as some of the worldâ€™s leading experts review and summarize the state of the art of theoretical and empirical studies of cooperation. This book is thus the first to bridge the gap between parallel research in primatology and studies of humans. Comparative as this approach is, it highlights both common principles and aspects of human uniqueness with respect to cooperative behavior.

Customer Reviews:

Definitive State of the Art Analysis.......2007-04-02

Everyone in the field of animal and human behavior should go over this book. The authors are the very best in their line of research, the research is quite up to date, and the various authors complement one another's finding beautifully.

The relationship between human and non-human primate behavior is very important for elucidating the characteristics of individual species because, as it turns out, it is often much easier to identify a form of behavior by viewing it as part of a larger swath of behavior occuring in a variety of species, rather than viewing the behavior in isolation. It is especially difficult to problematize human behavior because, this being our own species, we tend to see as 'natural' or the simple product of human cognitive capacity, what is in fact, a highly developed adaptation (such as imitation). In this regard, it would have been nice to include a chapter or two on cooperation in various species of birds, especially nesting birds, that share much with primates in terms of social organization, intelligence, and behavior.

The book manages to avoid the back-biting and interminable recriminations that often accompany biologically oriented research into human and primate nature. There is, however, one exception. Robert Trivers attempts to save his 35 year old theory from competition by newer theories by launching a bitter attack on the newer authors (of which I am one). He does so not by dealing with the issues, but by selectively quoting out of context and attempting to make his opponents look silly and stupid. They are not. Indeed, they are without much doubt, essentially correct in suggesting gene-culture coevolutionary forces as central to cooperation in large groups of unrelated humans. This does not at all compromise Trivers' fine work, which addresses dyadic interactions alone.

A Darwinian Left: Politics, Evolution, and Cooperation

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Disappointing
Marx versus Darwin?
Facing the reality of human nature.
New ways for the left.
Welcome but not new

A Darwinian Left: Politics, Evolution, and Cooperation
Peter Singer
Manufacturer: Yale University Press
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ASIN: 0300083238

Amazon.com

Philosophers don't have to be arcane and out of touch. Princeton's Peter Singer gives 21st-century liberals and radicals something to think about with the slim but powerful volume of Darwinism Today titled A Darwinian Left. Long noted for holding controversial bioethical beliefs related to animal rights, abortion, and euthanasia, Singer tends to quickly polarize his readers. This time, he chooses to antagonize those most sympathetic with his positions, arguing that the political left should re-evaluate its dependence on Marxism and its shunning of Darwinism. His writing is lucid and pulls no punches in examining the consequences of 20th-century answers to poverty; fans of the welfare state are in for some discomfort.

But Singer sees making a few liberals squirm as crucial to stealing Darwinism from the right and combining the noble desire to help the helpless with a realistic view of human nature and evolution. He builds a compelling line of thought, peppered with examples, that shows how our competitive "survival of the fittest" conception of evolution falls far short of modern scientific thinking. Instead, Singer suggests we incorporate a Darwinian ethic of cooperation into our political thought and reflect carefully on the consequences of our remedies for the evils of the world. --Rob Lightner

Book Description

In A Darwinian Left, Peter Singer argues that the political left has misunderstood Darwinian ideas and as a result been hostile to the application of Darwinian thinking to politics. Those on the political left who seek a more egalitarian society should instead embrace evolutionary ideas and learn how to use evolutionary thinking in order to build the kind of cooperative society sought.

Customer Reviews:

Disappointing.......2007-01-10

"A Darwinian Left" is an attempt to reconcile the apparent brutality of natural selection with progressive compassion. I enjoyed reading the book, but was hoping for a bit more substance.

Singer argued that humans naturally act altruistically and cooperatively, but he did not spend time talking about political changes that could promote this kind of behavior. The essay is unfinished. The book does not deliver on its promise.

I respect Peter Singer as a philosopher, but "A Darwinian Left" is disappointing.

Marx versus Darwin?.......2006-03-10

In this book, the controversial Peter Singer does two very interesting things. First, he explains why the Left has historically been wrong concerning human nature. Second, he proposes an alternative view: a leftist approach compatible with what Darwin teaches regarding our behavior.

I think the book is worth reading for the first part alone (which is actually most of the book). Singer's analysis of Marxism, and of the modern politically correct liberals who dislike Darwinism, is first rate. This is why I give the book such a high rating. But I cannot give it the highest rating because I cannot agree with the second part, since I do not think the government has the right to do the sorts of things that leftists like Singer believe it should do.

One final point: in the introduction, Singer defines "the Left" as being simply those people who care about pain and suffering, and who want to do something about it. That's just a blatant falsehood. There are plenty of people on the Left who couldn't care less about the suffering of others and plenty of people on the Right who do. My advice to the reader is to ignore nonsense like that and go on to the rest of the book. It's worthwhile in spite of such flaws.

Facing the reality of human nature........2005-12-18

This is an excellent short book. It encapsulates clearly the importance for the left to acknowledge Darwinism and learn from it.
The 'right' may believe that we can do nothing about our nature and that those who fall by the wayside are inevitable casualties. But the left is still on the side of the weak, poor, oppressed etc and an understanding of our evolved nature gives us more of a realistic prospect of making social changes that will actually be of benefit.

Singer argues against the Marx and Engels' historical materialism view that the mode of production creates human consciousness. He also argues against their separation of humans from all the evolution that preceded them or affects other animals.
To focus on the mode of production as the creator of human nature is 'like looking at the differences in military tactics as weapons have changed over the centuries without ever asking why nations go to war'.

Singer only touches on possible ways forward as we give proper consideration to self-interest as well as how we might be more successful in fostering cooperation and altruism.

This is a clear, succinct and realistic view from the left and potentially a good foundation on which to build realistic visions of what we, as humans, might become.

New ways for the left........2005-08-18

The left is in crises for being pursuing the same old ideals and for failing to implement them. It needs to reconsider them and reestablish new goals. Evolution, from a Darwinist point of view, can be a source for understanding why the old ideals did not work. But, mostly important, for helping in choosing new ones not subject to the same obstructions. This is the thesis defended in "A Darwinian Left".

Darwinism in politics, economics, in social interaction in general, is often simplistically associated with "right-wing" values such as "the strong survives while the weak perishes", claimed as a natural law of nature which contributes to the evolution of mankind. Competition is good, natural and makes us better in the long run. There are two strong challenges against this point of view. The first is that although Darwinism does not link evolution to any kind of improvement from an ethical point of view, that is usually implied in the right-wing speech. The second one is that this speech ignores another aspect of social strategy which is as present and important in Darwinism as competition is. Namely, cooperation. As it is very well pointed out and defended in the book, cooperation is a valuable strategy for success and that is reflected in evolution. We are naturally competitive but also naturally cooperative (e.g., to use an example of the book, true altruism does exist, for instance in the figure of a blood donor, who does that out of no reward). The left could (and should) seek new ideals by understanding, exploring and stimulating our cooperative side.

The book defends these ideas. It is short, easy to read, well developed and supported. It does not go as far as to propose solid strategies. Its goal is to point out a direction, and it is quite successful in doing so.

Welcome but not new.......2005-04-13

It's certainly welcome to see these ideas espoused by as prominent a thinker as Peter Singer. One caveat though to those rushing to hail Singer's "original" and "bold new" ideas: the idea that Darwinism, correctly interpreted, implies social cooperation (rather than Spencerian competition) was the central theme of the philosophy of the 19th-century anarchist Peter Kropotkin, as argued in such books as Mutual Aid. (Singer is of course aware of this and makes no claims to the contrary.) For those interested in something less abstract, Ursula Leguin's utopian novel The Dispossessed makes life in a Kropotkin-inspired (and I suppose now we must say "Singerian") anarchist utopia concrete and realistic enough to shift the question about anarchism from "Could it work?" to "Is it desirable?" Her characters are recognizably human, not angels, and she makes their humanity a source of uncertainty over how well such a society would function in the long haul. This may make it sound too pedantic and it does have its speechifying moments, but it's also a good novel in its own right.

Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (Dover Value Editions)

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An early view of the evolution of cooperation
excelente version del anarquismo
highly informative, but outdated
Shredding our cultural bias about nature
Required bio reading

Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (Dover Value Editions)
Peter Kropotkin
Manufacturer: Dover Publications
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ASIN: 0486449130

Book Description

In a work of stunning and well-reasoned scholarship, a famous anarchist posits that the most effective human and animal communities are essentially cooperative, rather than competitive. Essential to the understanding of human evolution as well as social organization, this book offers a powerful counterpoint to the tenets of Social Darwinism.

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Sociability and need of mutual aid and support are such inherent parts of human nature that at no time of history can we discover men living in small isolated families, fighting each other for the means of subsistence. On the contrary, modern research, as we saw it in the two preceding chapters, proves that since the very beginning of their prehistoric life men used to agglomerate into gentes, clans, or tribes, maintained by an idea of common descent and by worship of common ancestors.

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An early view of the evolution of cooperation.......2007-02-23

Peter Kropotkin is one of the most noteworthy anarchist thinkers over the last two centuries. As with other political thinkers, so, too, with Kropotkin--his analy¬sis of human nature is critical for understanding his overall philosophical position. For his view of human nature, "Mutual Aid" is a key for understanding his views. His work is a harbinger of more recent studies of sociobiology, many of which explore the roots of altruism--human and otherwise.

Much of his thinking on the nature of society was formed when he was observing the behavior of animals in Siberia. While assigned to a Siberian regiment of the Russian military, Kropotkin did innovative original work on geography and geology as well as the study of animal behavior. His observation of animals led him to respond to Huxley's assertion that natural selection was based on keen com¬petition among animals with the following statement: ". . .wherever I saw animal life in abundance, as, for instance, on the lakes where scores of species and millions of individuals came together to rear their progeny; in the colonies of rodents; in the migration of birds which took place at that time on a truly American scale along the Usuri; and especially in a migration of fallow-deer which I witnessed on the Amur, and during which scores of thousands of these animals came together from an immense territory, flying before the coming snow, in order to cross the Amur where it is narrowest--in all these scenes of animal life which passed before my eyes, I saw Mutual Aid and Mutual Support carried on to an extent which made me suspect in it a feature of the greatest importance for the maintenance of life, the preservation of each species, and its further evolution."

He synthesized his observations of animals within a species cooperating with one another and concluded that, in the struggle for life, cooperation was at least as important as competition. Kropotkin did not argue that competition was unimportant in the natural selection process. However, he did emphasize that mutual aid was a factor that many Darwinists (although, as Kropotkin made clear, not Darwin himself) ignored. The data that Kropotkin utilized came from many different animal species.

Kropotkin goes on to speculate about the survival value of cooperative behavior. He states that: "Life in societies enables the feeblest insects, the feeblest birds, and the feeblest mammals to resist, or to protect themselves from, the most terrible birds and beasts of prey; it permits longevity; in enables the species to rear its progeny with the least waste of energy and to maintain its progeny with the least waste of energy and to maintain its numbers albeit a very slow birth rate; it enables the gregarious animals to migrate in search of new abodes. Furthermore, cooperation facilitates the development of intelligence, since that quality is so important for social life among animals."

Kropotkin is not content to rest his case at this point. He subsequently indicates the likely course of human evolution and the role played by cooperation. He adopts the method of using existing societies at differing levels of socio-cultural complexity to speculate about the course of human socio-cultural evolution. Kropotkin argues that, at each stage, mutual aid is apparent and important for humans. Even in the period dominated by the great states, the present for Kropotkin, mutual aid institutions still flourished despite the state's intimidating presence.

Thus, Kropotkin's view of human nature is, ultimately, that it is inherently good, i.e. cooperative toward his or her fellow. What of this assertion? Is Kropotkin's view of human nature completely inaccurate and confounded by the available evidence? That is where each reader must evaluate his or her view of humanity's nature and render a judgment on "the anarchist prince."

excelente version del anarquismo.......2007-01-24

Este libro es uno de los pilares fundamentales de la teoria del anarco comunismo tan desvirtuada por el imperialismo, y nos da la esencia que el anarquismo, lejos de lo que se cree comunmente es una doctrina que se basa en el amor y la ayuda mutua, quitando las barreras de desigualdad entre las personas y haciendo un recuento de cómo la ayuda mutua es un factor de evolución hcia una sociedad más justa.

highly informative, but outdated.......2006-11-13

First, Kropotkin discusses mutual aid among animals. His first point is that Darwin had nothing to do with Social Darwinianism. In fact, he quotes Darwin as saying, "Those communities which included the greatest number of the sympathetic members would flourish best, and rear the greatest number of offspring."

He gives numerous examples. One of his examples is about the crested screamer, a bird species which holds massive song recitals. Would Lorenz agree that those birds are chirping merrily? Or would he insist that they are marking their territory?

Next, he discusses mutual aid among savages. Note that he uses a word which is scientifically unacceptable today.

Since K. cannot travel back in time, he surmises how our earliest ancestors lived by observing how isolated tribes today live--which is in clans. Although such tribes are still called "primitive," there is some question of whether or not these tribes live like our prehistoric ancestors did.

Since isolated tribes tend to live in clans, Kropotkin claims that the marital bond is not as strong as in the nuclear family system. In the appendix, he debates Westermarck on this matter.

Next, he discusses mutual aid among barbarians--another taboo word. According to K., there was a wave of migrations in ancient Europe, in which "races were mixing with races." The social institutions seemed to be wrecked as a result, but K. assures us that they instead "underwent the modification which was required by the new conditions of life."

Next, he discusses mutual aid in the medieval city. Now we are up to the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries. Our next institution, then, is the professional guild.

Finally, he discusses mutual aid among ourselves. He sees a faint vestige of mutual aid today. K. sees the union as the successor of the clan, the village, and the guild, so he calls for more and better unions. K. also speaks highly of organizations with special interests, such as garden clubs and glee clubs.

However, K. cautions us against the "reckless individualism," or "the war of each against all," which he sees as prevailing today.

Kropotkin's discussion, persuasive as it is, can be counterbalanced with arguments in favor of individualism and competition. I wonder how Kropotkin would respond to the famous anecdote about the Jamestown colonists.

One can also question Kropotkin's claim that only the most sociable animal species prosper. The feline order is renowned for the aloofness of its members, and the lion has been dubbed "the king of the beasts."

I would like to close this report with an ad hominem attack against Kropotkin himself: If individualism is so reprehensible, what is he doing writing a book by himself and claiming credit for it by himself?

Shredding our cultural bias about nature.......2005-06-04

Anarchist classic, rooted in observation of natural phenomena and history. Challenges the conception that capitalism is a natural progression of Darwinism at work in the wild. The author cites numerous examples of compassion and innate goodness at work outside the bounds of a structured power-based society. The study covers cooperation among animals, instances of non-hierachical interactions from primitive tribes to mediaeval cities, and on to his contemporary labor unions. It has been some years since I read it and I plan to revisit this title soon.

Required bio reading.......2002-08-17

This book, which appears to be about the only surviving scientific text from Kropotkin's work, is very interesting and insightful. The first two chapters which deal with animals I found most interesting, because they address the roots of the falsehood of social-darwinism. Kropotkin then proceeds to move through the different stages of human society and describes the mutual aid a compassion fetures therein. It is a fantastic book and I highly recommend it. It is a scientific text, but it has major political implications and is very accessible.

Constructing Cooperation: The Evolution of Institutions of Comanagement

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Constructing Cooperation: The Evolution of Institutions of Comanagement
Sara Gail Singleton
Manufacturer: University of Michigan Press
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In a pathbreaking analysis, Sara Singleton explores the development of schemes for the management of fisheries in the northwestern United States in which native American tribes, and state, federal, and local governments cooperate to manage limited fishing resources. In the policy dispute over the apportionment of scarce resources, some argue that only government control or private ownership will prevent the destruction of limited common resources. The author shows how cooperation among interested parties can produce a workable system for self-management of common resources. Through the detailed study of the management of fisheries in the Northwest the author tests theories explaining the basis of collective action and social cooperation, an area of rich theoretical speculation in political science, law, economics and sociology. At the same time, her findings have important implications for policy makers who are interested in efficient and effective schemes of resource control that avoid the problems caused by regulation by remote government officials or private control.

This book will appeal to policy makers concerned with the management of natural resources as well as to economists, political scientists, and sociologists concerned with collective action problems.

Sara Singleton is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Tulane University.

Survival Strategies: Cooperation and Conflict in Animal Societies

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Beautiful, Charming, yet Scientfically Challenging

Survival Strategies: Cooperation and Conflict in Animal Societies
Raghavendra Gadagkar
Manufacturer: Harvard University Press
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ASIN: 0674005570

Book Description

Did you know that Tasmanian hens have two husbands? That cellular slime molds commit suicide? That vampire bats will share food with hungry fellow bats and that hanuman langurs commit infanticide? Why creatures great and small behave in such fascinating and seemingly perplexing ways is explained in this delightful account of the evolutionary foundations of animal social behavior.

Only in recent years have biologists and ethologists begun to apply careful evolutionary thinking to the study of animal societies--and with spectacular results. This book presents the choicest of these findings, with a remarkable wealth of insights into the myriad strategies that animals have developed to perpetuate their kind. In an irresistible style, Raghavendra Gadagkar explores the strategies of cooperation and conflict adopted by animals--from the lordly lion to the primitive wasp worker--as they choose mates, raise their young, communicate with others, and establish the division of labor necessary to feed and protect the group and safeguard their territory.

Whether focusing on the birds or the bees, this book offers both superb descriptions and lucid explanations of many different behaviors encountered in the animal world: why a ground squirrel will sound an alarm--even risk its own safety--to warn fellow squirrels of impending danger; why weaver ant larvae donate silk for nest building; why house mice raise their offspring in a communal nursery; and how animals can recognize the relatives they want to favor--or avoid.

Illustrated with both photographs and explanatory diagrams, this expert and inviting tour of the social world of animals will inform and charm anyone curious about the motivations behind the amazing range of activity in the animal kingdom.

Customer Reviews:

Beautiful, Charming, yet Scientfically Challenging.......2001-08-21

I first encountered Gadagkar through his work on genetic relatedness in wasps and bees. His professional work is extremely careful, quantitative, and innovative. I was surprised to find a different side of this impressive animal behaviorist in this charming little book. Gadagkar has an admirable ability to explain complex biological theory without recourse to complicated terminology and equations.

The centerpiece of Gadagkar's interpretation of cooperation and conflict in animal societies is Hamilton's inequality, which says that individuals will, in the long run, help others at a cost to themselves, if the benefit to the others times their relatedness to the helper is greater than the cost to the helper. This simple little equation is a powerful leitmotif that runs through each and every example in this book. And the examples are extremely elegant and memorable---reading this reminded me of when I read Ray Bradbury's Illustrated Man when I was a kid, so wide ranging and daring are his examples---except that in this case what is being described is scientifically impeccable.

This book is great for beginners in sociobiology and animal behavior, but it is also a wonderful treat for those (like myself) who have read widely in the field.

Book Description

Despite the depiction of nature "red in tooth and claw," cooperation is actually widespread in the animal kingdom. Various types of cooperative behaviors have been documented in everything from insects to primates, and in every imaginable ecological scenario. Yet why animals cooperate is still a hotly contested question in literature on evolution and animal behavior. This book examines the history surrounding the study of cooperation, and proceeds to examine the conceptual, theoretical and empirical work on this fascinating subject. Early on, it outlines the four different categories of cooperation -- reciprocal altruism, kinship, group-selected cooperation and byproduct mutualism -- and ties these categories together in a single framework called the Cooperator's Dilemma. Hundreds of studies on cooperation in insects, fish, birds and mammals are reviewed. Cooperation in this wide array of taxa includes, but is not limited to, cooperative hunting, anti-predator behavior, foraging, sexual coalitions, grooming, helpers-at-the nest, territoriality, 'policing' behavior and group thermoregulation. Each example outlined is tied back to the theoretical framework developed early on, whenever the data allows. Future experiments designed to further elucidate a particular type of cooperation are provided throughout the book.

Evolution of International Aviation: Phoenix Rising (Ashgate Studies in Aviation Economics and Management)

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Evolution of International Aviation: Phoenix Rising (Ashgate Studies in Aviation Economics and Management)
Dawna L. Rhoades
Manufacturer: Ashgate Publishing
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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