History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)

Book Description

Recorded history is a finely-woven magic fabric of intricate lies about events predating the sixteenth century. There is not a single piece of evidence that can be reliably and independently traced back earlier than the eleventh century. This book details events that are substantiated by hard facts and logic, and validated by new astronomical research and statistical analysis of ancient sources.

Customer Reviews:

Calculations are only as good as your numbers.......2007-08-03

Yes, we can all agree that mainstream history is nearly 100% BS due to politics, economics, ego, problems with dating techniques, and various conspiracies. Agreed. But, I've been researching the distinct possibility that human history (in terms of civilizations) are much more ancient than we've been told, so coming across this book was very interesting to me. I wondered how Fomenko could be wrong (if at all) because he is very persuasive in his presentations. Then it dawned on me. If at previous times in prehistory, due to the various catastrophies that are well documented (comets, asteroids, planetary disruptions, plasma discharge, pole reversals, etc) the Earth was in a different position in relation to the sun, different tilt on its axis, different orbit, different rotation (in terms of velocity and DIRECTION), and the continents were in different positions, then would this not cause the ancients to see the sky (constellations) differently? In other words, is Fomenko making erronious assumptions about the physics of the Earth in pre-history, which then corrupt his data with regards to dating the relevant astrology? The last event to seriously disrupt our planet occured roughly 3500 years ago, according to other good researchers, so is it possible Fomenko has been confused by this? The vastly different physics of our planet in the not so distant past may explain this confusion, which is not to say the "mainstream" version of history is correct; on the contrary. I am not an expert in these fields, but wanted to see if this idea could spark discussion.

Pants on fire?.......2007-07-19

Will people ever read before spamming? Yes, Jesuits could not rewrite world history alone, they had help. Anyway, Dr Prof Acad A.Fomenko does not point to jesuits as the driving force of world wide history manipulation in published volumes 1,2,3;, actually he barely mentions the poor devils. Check it with 'Search inside' feature, please. China is rarely mentioned either, in fact, Dr Fomenko is completely eurocentric. Right, his theory contradicts all mainstream schools of history, because in their actual state they are all built on blatantly erroneus chronology. You don't need a mysterious cabal (conspiracy) to falsify history, the falsification is its modus operandi. It is inherent to history(ians) to falsify (distort) events, as it is inherent to humans to boast as it is inherent to power (authority) to legimize itself by referrring to glorious past made to its own order. Dr Prof Fomenko and team have identified scores of instances of such manipulation in Russian, European, etc.. history, and delivered valid statistical proof thereof. His own 'reconstruction' is completely another story. Forget c14 as a valid method of dating. W.Libby has initially discovered a brilliant method of INDEPENDENT dating. Too bad, c14 method has become a joke after a forced marrige with dendrochronology with consensual chronological scale inbuilt. Radiocarbon method can't stand blind tests, but is so very productive as a rubberstamp.

Accepted History & Chronology Must Be Changed. .......2007-04-09

There is no doubt that history as most know it is a sham, & institution's version of History both University & Church is fradulent & inaccurate. Everything was established with an agenda, The real "Dark Ages" are now when we have access to incredible amounts of information past authorities & more important 'common folk' didn't have but our institutions & educators are slow to evolve because of what has ignorantly & arrogantly been taught for too long. This is on many subjects not just Chronology.

For anyone to question "Why would a Mathematician have anything credible to say of History?" The answer is from Dr. Fomenko's preface in the book: "It would be worthwhile to remind the reader that in the XVI-XVII century Chronology was considered to be a subdivision of Mathematics." These volumes could possibly be some of the most important works to date & should be read by everyone with an interest in History, especially professors & educators who have a duty to the public. I have read both books & must say that 'Chronology 1' has some very eye opening & revolutionary information. Even if these volumes are part true the implications are profound & opens the doors to further investigations & questions which must be done. I speak several different lanquages & must say the logic Dr. Fomenko uses with "inflection" of words & words being read from left to right in one region & right to left in another then written backwards, the removal of vowels & get down to basics of words, or different cities & locations having the same name etc. is correct. Vowel usage has always been optional & varied, actually complicating linquistics & study. The first thing one has to understand is that words never had a fixed spelling in history like we do now, the spelling of words was mutable & regional, as well as names & titles of people were vast, varied & changed, NOTHING WAS FIXED or understood linear. Matters of Life & Death as well as financial profiteering yesterday & today were & are made with ignorant, illogical & conspiratorial views of history & reality, it's time people get closer to the Truth & society collectively grow up.

Very Interesting.......2007-03-07

It is a good proposal and I believe it will mature into something even better in the future. I think it deserves to be read.

History as Science Fiction.......2007-01-10

Anatoly Fomenko has written a very intriguing book, full of pictures, charts, and computer 'proof' of his thesis: backwards of AD900 we don't really know what happened or when. Between AD900 and AD1600 there is more certainty, but there is still a lot of fuzzy ground, and things don't get reliable until we get past the 1600's where the printing press made it very difficult for the perpetrators of this timeline manipulation to change anything that had been committed to print. The Dark Ages did not happen. Books were burned for a reason. One organization has doubled the actual length of its existence by expanding the real chronology. Read why.

I had always wondered why Christ died about AD33 and yet men waited until the 11th century to form the Knights Templar, the Cathars, etc and go after the Holy Land by force. Why the 1000 year gap? Turns out there wasn't more than a 10-12 year gap and he proves it using astronomy. This also implies that the planet is not as old as we have been told, and current Christian and other creationist scientists are already championing that idea without being aware of Fomenko's book. The two groups, creationist scientists and the Russian mathematical analysts corroborate each other. Fascinating.

Of course, all this flies in the face of what we have been told traditionally is the 'proper' chronology of western civilization, and most readers will experience 'cognitive dissonance' in reading this book. It means that our history going backwards from AD1600 becomes progressively more incorrect and unreliable until it cannot be trusted at all... in the space of 700-800 years.

Naturally, the curious, open-minded reader will want to know WHO did this, WHY, and did any of the events we think of as really ancient ever happen?
Dr. Fomenko is a respected scientist/mathematician at Moscow State University who has already answered these questions to the satisfaction of his initially skeptical colleagues. Most of them are now believers, a few still refuse to believe (the usual diehards), and of course the western press has ignored Fomenko's work -- for obvious reasons when you read the book. The ones who perpetrated this chronology ruse have a lot to answer for. They are still with us. That's why this book is a well-kept secret.

I gave the book a 4-star rating because I was unable to check out some of his claims; those I checked were as he said. But if even 1/3 of his claims are true, this punches a big hole in what we think is our history, the meaning of western civilization, our educational process (for repeating the ruse as gospel), and the trustworthiness of the organization that perpetrated this ruse, well-intentioned or not.

This book relates to current research into a Young Earth paradigm, to John Keel's discoveries about our planet, and Fr Malachi Martin's insights (in his now out-of-print books). We are indeed sheep who are manipulated and kept ignorant -- for a reason. While knowing what these men have to say may be the "booby prize" (as in: 'what can you do with this knowledge?'), it will provide interesting reading. Didn't someone say: "...and the Truth will set you free."?? For you to judge if this book contains the truth.

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Everyone should read this book
Good intro read
NOBLE PRIZE WINNER ON CONFLICT
Major contribution and still relevant after decades
fascinating

The Strategy of Conflict
Thomas C. Schelling
Manufacturer: Harvard University Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0674840313

Customer Reviews:

Everyone should read this book.......2006-09-08

"The Strategy of Conflict" changed the development of game theory in several ways, but none was more important than Schelling's focus on real life examples, situations or games that are relevant to what we encounter in our daily lives. Before Schelling, game theory analysis was abstract and mathematical; it focused on zero-sum games, where interests were purely conflicting and there were no incentives to cooperate. Game theorists built convincing abstract models for these types of games, but its application was limited, since most interactions were a mixture of conflict and mutual dependence. In other words, analysis focused on pure conflict, a limiting cases of real world interactions, while in "The Strategy of Conflict" Schelling attempts to generalize game theory analysis to richer games that are `played' in the real world. His generalization introduced the concepts, commitments, threats, promises, communication systems, focal points, and randomization of strategies into game theory (chapters 1~8), which was then used to analyze the its applications in national security (chapters 9 and 10).

If you are studying game theory, this book is a must read. If you are just interested in game theory, I'd recommend reading this book too.

Good intro read.......2006-02-17

Along with Dixit & Skeath, Schelling is a great intro read for anyone interested in game theory.

NOBLE PRIZE WINNER ON CONFLICT.......2005-10-11

The 2005 Nobel Prize for Economics was awarded to Robert Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling. Schelling is professor of Economics at the University of Maryland and applied game theory to conflict. His focus was on the weapons issues but his ideas have been applied to a host of business issues.

In this review, we will apply some of Shelling's concepts to how companies fire employees.

Schelling says "uncertain retaliation is more efficient than certain retaliation" when bargaining and "the capability to retaliate is more useful than the ability to defend." Now let's get practical.

GOODBYE SCENARIO

As a verb, "goodbye" is the act of parting. It is also an acknowledgement of parting. A goodbye scenario assumes that once employees physically leave the building, they will never be a factor for the company's future. The relationship was transactional and the transaction is now over.

If the firm defines the termination as a goodbye scenario, the firm should be guided by a business model that says, "What's the least expensive way of terminating this relationship?" And Board members should ask tough questions about paying too much.

AUWIEDERSEHEN SCENARIO

"Auwiedersehen" is German for "Until we meet again." It has a more open-ended quality than the English "goodbye." In an auwiedersehen scenario, the assumption is that once employees physically leave the building, they may continue to be a factor in the firm's future. But it is unclear what that factor may be.

After their non-compete contracts are over, they may join a smaller competitor and become potential allies or opponents in your firm's efforts to develop strategic alliances or acquire the firm.

They may join firms that touch your industry and become potential referral sources of new business for you or a potential source of caution to others about using your company.

They may attend alumni programs at their schools and encourage/discourage graduates from joining your firm.

Each of these scenarios assumes capability of retaliation plus uncertainty of retaliation.

The best practical defense in terminating employees under these conditions is "Treat people with dignity on the way out because the assured costs of such positive treatment are less than the potential downside retaliatory risks.

AUWIEDERSEHEN VS IT'S NICE TO BE NICE

We work with companies that treat departing leaders with dignity
on the grounds that "it is good public relations and good for morale if we help former employees achieve a `soft landing.'" This positive rationale works only in cultures supportive of such a rationale.

The Schelling rationale does not depend on an organizion having a specific culture for treating people with dignity.

It develops a contingency approach to management based on a risk assessment.

There may be times when a "goodbye" scenario does indeed make good sense. There are other times when "auwiedersehen" makes better economic sense.

In applying Professor Schelling's theories, management's failure to take defensive measures with those possessing abilities and options to retaliate is is just bad economics. One sees it at work every day.

(...)

Major contribution and still relevant after decades.......2003-11-09

Since its first publication in 1960, the strategy of Conflict is still relevant today. His concepts of strategic moves and random strategy can still be applied to the increasing complicated international affairs. It's definitely a timeless classic for game theoretical study of international relations.

fascinating.......2002-12-07

I disagree with the review that describes Schelling's primary contribution here as the idea of focal points. This is one of the key insights in the book, but only one. He also has a fascinating discussion of threats, promises, and credibility and the relation of these issues to national security issues. The connection is explored further in Schelling's Arms and Influence, while this book is more theoretical in its orientation. I highly recommend this book to anyone who knows a little game theory but is frustrated by the level of abstraction which pervades the theory.

Political Game Theory: An Introduction (Analytical Methods for Social Research)

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Political Game Theory: An Introduction (Analytical Methods for Social Research)
Nolan McCarty , and Adam Meirowitz
Manufacturer: Cambridge University Press
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Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 0521841070

Book Description

Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.

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Good concepts, bad writing
Answer keys are a little bit questionable.
Excellent graduate level textbook
Excellent introductory text: it's as technical as you want

Game Theory for Political Scientists
James D. Morrow
Manufacturer: Princeton University Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 0691034303

Book Description

Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interaction. In the fifty years since the appearance of von Neumann and Morgenstern's classic Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1944), game theory has been widely applied to problems in economics. Until recently, however, its usefulness in political science has been underappreciated, in part because of the technical difficulty of the methods developed by economists. James Morrow's book is the first to provide a standard text adapting contemporary game theory to political analysis. It uses a minimum of mathematics to teach the essentials of game theory and contains problems and their solutions suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in all branches of political science.

Morrow begins with classical utility and game theory and ends with current research on repeated games and games of incomplete information. The book focuses on noncooperative game theory and its application to international relations, political economy, and American and comparative politics. Special attention is given to models of four topics: bargaining, legislative voting rules, voting in mass elections, and deterrence. An appendix reviews relevant mathematical techniques. Brief bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter suggest further readings, graded according to difficulty. This rigorous but accessible introduction to game theory will be of use not only to political scientists but also to psychologists, sociologists, and others in the social sciences.

Customer Reviews:

Good concepts, bad writing.......2004-11-06

I am currently using this book as a text for a graduate level game theory course for political scientists. Although Morrow does a good job covering the important concepts, the writing is wordy, awkward, and confusing. It makes it difficult to follow some of the more complicated problems, especially when learning the ideas for the first time. I would only recommend this book for people who already have a grasp of the ideas and want to learn more and see examples -- not so useful for first-time game theorists.

Answer keys are a little bit questionable........2003-01-23

There are apparently two versions floating around (from the same edition and same printing) with different answer keys in the back for some of the more difficult problems.

Otherwise, this is the standard textbook for game theory for political science. I'm inspired to read Schelling!

Excellent graduate level textbook.......2000-08-29

This book is an excellent introduction to game theory for the political science graduate student. Although some prior knowledge of economics and game theory would certainly help, the early chapters in the book are excellent in familiarizing the reader with basic formal concepts.

A few comments by the previous reviewer may be misunderstood by some readers. This is NOT a "general concepts" book - in other words this is NOT game theory for poets - not that I hold anything against poets. This book does require some undergraduate level mathematics, mainly differential and integral calculus. Those looking for rigorous formal proofs of all theorems will be disappointed, but this is a technical book with an emphasis on demonstrating the application of formal tools to common problems in political science. Some of the material such as the chapter on perfect and sequential equilibria can be quite challenging.

If you merely wish to get a sense of what formal political science is all about and do not intend to actually fire up the old calculator, I suggest Robert Axelrod's excellent book "The Evolution of Cooperation".

Excellent introductory text: it's as technical as you want.......2000-05-16

One of the nice things about this book is it can be as technical or mathematical as you want. If you just want the concepts, you won't be jarred by lots of equations. But if you like the technical aspects, they're all there, especially in the appendix.

Great simple treatment of everything from basic Nash Equilibrium to more sophisticated concepts such as Bayesian information analysis.

The only potential disappointment of this book is if you know game theory well and are looking for something very sophisticated, this is not the book for you -- not because there's anything wrong with this book, but because it wasn't designed for that level.

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Narrativistic Public Choice Theory

Analytic Narratives
Robert H. Bates , Avner Greif , Margaret Levi , Jean-Laurent Rosenthal , Barry R Weingast , and Barry R. Weingast
Manufacturer: Princeton University Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis

Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

ASIN: 0691001294

Book Description

Students of comparative politics have long faced a vexing dilemma: how can social scientists draw broad, applicable principles of political order from specific historical examples? In Analytic Narratives, five senior scholars offer a new and ambitious methodological response to this important question. By employing rational-choice and game theory, the authors propose a way of extracting empirically testable, general hypotheses from particular cases. The result is both a methodological manifesto and an applied handbook that political scientists, economic historians, sociologists, and students of political economy will find essential.

In their jointly written introduction, the authors frame their approach to the origins and evolution of political institutions. The individual essays that follow demonstrate the concept of the analytic narrative--a rational-choice approach to explain political outcomes--in case studies. Avner Greif traces the institutional foundations of commercial expansion in twelfth-century Genoa. Jean-Laurent Rosenthal analyzes how divergent fiscal policies affected absolutist European governments, while Margaret Levi examines the transformation of nineteenth-century conscription laws in France, the United States, and Prussia. Robert Bates explores the emergence of a regulatory organization in the international coffee market. Finally, Barry Weingast studies the institutional foundations of democracy in the antebellum United States and its breakdown in the Civil War. In the process, these studies highlight the economic role of political organizations, the rise and deterioration of political communities, and the role of coercion, especially warfare, in political life. The results are both empirically relevant and theoretically sophisticated.

Analytic Narratives is an innovative and provocative work that bridges the gap between the game-theoretic and empirically driven approaches in political economy. Political historians will find the use of rational-choice models novel; theorists will discover arguments more robust and nuanced than those derived from abstract models. The book improves on earlier studies by advocating--and applying--a cross-disciplinary approach to explain strategic decision making in history.

Customer Reviews:

Narrativistic Public Choice Theory.......2000-07-03

The book under review is one of the best books that has appeared in the field of Public Choice Theroy. Myself doing a post-doctoral research on the public choice theory, I found it a necessary reading for not only those interested in the field but also for general scholars of political theory. The author has covered almost all the necessary subjects about which all over the world increasing attention is being paid or needs to be paid. This book is an answer to those who find public choice theory as basically a statistical theory only. The books has actually covered all the philosophical underpinnings of the public choice therory. This books stands out to be a highly recommended reading for scholars of social science. Sukant Vyas Lecturer Department of Political Science Dyal Singh (Evening) College Lodi Road New Delhi - 110003 (India)

Fanatics and Fools: The Game Plan for Winning Back America

Average customer rating:

Arianna is simply brilliant.
Good Points, but Too Much "Humor"
Throws haymakers to both the left and the right
Argumentum ad Hominum
Much valid criticism but not enough game plan!

Fanatics and Fools: The Game Plan for Winning Back America
Arianna Huffington
Manufacturer: Miramax
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Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 1401352138
Release Date: 2004-04-14

Amazon.com

Arianna Huffington is a rare breed of political celebrity: an articulate pundit who left the intellectually safe world of criticizing elected officials to try her hand at actually becoming one. While her campaign for Governor of California in the highly unusual 2003 recall election was unsuccessful, the experience has brought valuable insight and perspective to Fanatics and Fools. Huffington, a former supporter of Newt Gingrich, has recently occupied a unique place in the political landscape as she moved away from the right, never quite arrived at the left and dwelled somewhere askew from what is thought of as the center. In this book, she grudgingly endorses the idea of voting with the Democrats in the 2004 presidential election despite grave misgivings about the Democratic Party, which she accuses of too often trying to be a watered-down of the Republicans. But even those Democrats, she feels, are infinitely preferable to the George W. Bush administration with its record of corporate favoritism and patterns of deception leading up to the invasion of Iraq. A section chronicling her experience in campaigning may not seem particularly relevant to people living outside California, but it's a pretty interesting passage. Few skilled opinion makers ever get out and run themselves (imagine George Will or David Broder giving stump speeches), and Huffington brings humor and humility to her account. Her characterization of Arnold Schwarzenegger includes stinging criticisms of his policies but conveys grudging admiration for the actor turned Governor. Her criticisms of Bush and the Republicans are impassioned; well supported, their sheer volume impedes her effort to create a unified message. Still, Huffington's wit and candor, coupled with her recently gained battleground experience, make Fanatics and Fools a terrific read. --John Moe

Book Description

Customer Reviews:

Arianna is simply brilliant........2007-03-22

This is a book everyone from both political parties should read. She lays out exactly what is currently wrong with the state of American politics. Fantacis on the right, Fools on the left and America is suffering because of it. As someone who has been a member of both parties, was the keynote speaker at the republican convention (I believe it was in 93) and ran against Arnold in Claifonrnia Arianna is in a very unique postition to know what she is talking about. Highly reccomended.

Good Points, but Too Much "Humor".......2006-07-11

Huffington sees three key issues facing the U.S.: 1)We've become two nations, separated by an ever-widening economic, health care, and education gulf, 2)the way money is corrupting our politics, and 3)the nation's failed $40 billion/year war on drugs.

The "fanatics" in this book are Bush and his fellow Republicans - they don't allow reason to interfere with beliefs, are unmindful of contradictions in the positions, and believe their cause has been blessed by God. She sees Bush Republicans' self-righteous prattle about the fiscal irresponsibility of eg. Greg Davis as laughable, considering what they do in Washington.

"Fanatics and Fools" then goes on to list innumerable absurdities by Bush and his administration, always sharpened with sarcasms that eventually become tiresome.

The "fools" in Huffington's opinion are Democrats, whom she calls "the pusillanimous opposition" (I had to look that one up). Her point is well taken, and she backs it up with Democratic leaders repeated fear of taking a strong position opposing Bush lest they be painted as anti-American.

The author suggests they begin by redefining the language of politics. "Responsibility" should also add social considerations to the R's focus on individual aspects, "family values" should include the strains caused by families needing to have two or more sources of income while still lacking health insurance., etc.

Recommendations for A Better America: 1)Energy Independence, Health Care for All (including preventive care), 2)Redeploy Drug War Monies to Protecting Inner-City Youth from Violence, 3)Secure the Homeland First, 4)Restore Integrity to the Political Process, and 5)Stop Outsourcing Jobs for Increased Corporate Profits.

Looking forward to her next book - hopefully a bit less "humor

Throws haymakers to both the left and the right.......2005-10-28

Of all her books, this is ranked the highest. I love the fact that she pulls no punches to expose both political parties who've done nothing but to swindle the American people.

I hope that people like Micheal Moore and Anne Coulter would take off their blinders long enough to see the ills of the party they support.

Argumentum ad Hominum.......2005-01-25

I find it interesting that in the pages I scanned through that I couldn't find a single fact. All I found was the fallacy of "Argumentum ad Hominum" (Argument against the Man i.e. "He's a schmuck therefore anything he says or does isn't valid") Now, granted, I didn't (couldn't) read the whole book so I don't know if she got into any actual facts that could be looked up and verified but just the fact that what I did read was so obviously skewed by emotion doesn't lend any credence with me of the facts. I am NOT a Republican but I do like my information to be clear, concise and to have the ability to be verified. I do not appreciate "scare" tactics or emotional string pulling. Let me decide what my emotions should be by giving me the FACTS!

Much valid criticism but not enough game plan!.......2004-09-12

Arianna Huffington as always is informative and accurate in her scathing criticism of the Bush regime and the damage Bush and cronies are doing to the people of America and the world.... and anyone who does not yet intellectually and emotionally grasp the reality (indeed the horrors) existing under the rhetoric of our current government will benefit from reading this book. But having just previously read Senator Byrd's excellent LOSING AMERICA - which focused on the facts and Byrd's deeply felt and profound observations (in his case, of the power tactics, lack of conscience and integrity, and vicious partisanship he has witnessed among many of our Congresspersons) without ranting and name-calling, I found myself frustrated with Huntington.

Clearly the left needs its Huntington's and Franken's and Moore's - and I value all three of them. But Huntington is more likely to provide confirmation and an outlet for anger for those already strongly anti-Bush, while turning off the undecided with inflammatory language. Not all of us are empowered to political action by nonstop ranting. The realities speak for themselves. Let the reader learn of them, feel his or her own anger rather than react to the authors, and feel mobilized as a result to take action for new political alternatives. Too much ranting can leave one emotionally exhausted and depressed rather than empowered to help bring in a new government.

The Left also needs more specific clarification of its vision and agenda, and this book does not provide that in more than a few pages. After reading many anti-Bush books, I bought Huntington's latest because of the subtitle, "The Game Plan for Winning Back America". But the "Game Plan", in the simplest form, was really a brief addendum to a book which focused almost entirely on what is wrong, rather than what we need to make right and how to do it.

I do not however want to dissuade readers from buying and reading this book. The more you learn about what's really going on in this country and its effect on the world and future of this planet, the more appalled you may be... and the more committed to helping bring about a new Democratic regime. If you are wanting to learn more about what's wrong, read this book (and Hightower's Thieves in High Places, Hartmann's We the People, Derber's Regime Change Begins at Home and People Before Profit, and Byrd's Losing Ground - all which I preferred). But once you know what's wrong and are well-informed enough to share it with others, and once you have lived in your outrage long enough to want to channel your anger into commitment and vision, you may then be ready for a Game Plan for America which goes beyond Huntington. You might then wish to read John Kerry's Call to Service and Plan for America. They at least provide the seeds which can eventually blossom into a new kind of government, one which serves the needs of its people, in action as well as words.

Governing Fortune: Casino Gambling in America

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Governing Fortune: Casino Gambling in America
Ernest P. Goss , and Edward A. Morse
Manufacturer: University of Michigan Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0472069659

Book Description

Governing Fortune: Casino Gambling in America provides the background needed for citizens and policymakers to make informed decisions about gambling in America.

Edward A. Morse and Ernest P. Goss draw on their legal and economic experience to offer important insights to those wrestling with the policy dilemmas presented by legalized gambling. Rather than a polemic against gambling or an apology for it, Governing Fortune is an acute analysis of the industry, designed to help policymakers and interested citizens make informed choices.

Distinguishing Features

Evenhanded treatment of pro and con arguments for casino gambling.
Lucid and understandable explanation of the legal framework for regulating gambling, including both state and federal sources.
Comprehensive information on contemporary developments in gambling, including Internet gambling and problem gambling behaviors.

Book Description

The much-discussed book that explores how cooperation can emerge in a world of self-seeking egoists--whether superpowers, businesses, or individuals--when there is no central authority to police their actions.

Customer Reviews:

Extended edition IS NOT EXTENDED!!!!.......2007-04-26

"The updated edition includes an extensive new chapter on cooperation in cancer cells and among terrorist organizations."

WHAT?? I bought this, with the new preface and cover, and it DID NOT CONTAIN NEW MATERIAL IN THE BOOK. I wrote the published, and THEY DID NOT REPLY. Crappers.

Reconciling Individual Interest with Collective Interest.......2005-12-10

The goal of a model is to explain complex reality with parsimony. This means that a model is a simplification of reality or approximation to some aspect of our world. Likewise, the goal of game-model is also to explain reality by abstracting the important features of reality for a particular problem.

Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game has represented the reconstructed reality of international politics without overriding or overarching government authority, because it does not only explain persuasively why states have suffered from the problem of non-cooperation, but also show what states should do in international anarchy.

In PD game, the more self-interest each player pursues, the more collective interest both players lose. Nevertheless, they can not stop pursuing their self-interests. Otherwise, they will be faced to the worst case. As a result, all of players do not escape from social inefficiency and eternal conflict.

Hobbes, who described human existence in the state-of-nature as Bellum omnium contra omnes, suggested Leviathan as the solution to the dilemma. However, in that states exist in "international" anarchy, the argument is meaningless. If Hobbesian state-of-nature is the reality among nations, the world is in a constant state of war.

Axelrod finds the new puzzle in here: In situations where each individual has an incentive to be selfish, how can cooperation ever develop? His goal is to explain the cooperation under anarchy. To do so, he designs a variation of PD game with R > (T+S) / 2 value and introduces the concept of time. His explanation depends on the iterated PD game (IPD) where players do not know which is the final move.

Achieving socially efficient or Pareto-superior mutual cooperation in PD game is possible if the reciprocity works as times go by and the players consider the future consequences of their present actions with foresight (the reciprocity is emphasized much more than foresight). Especially, Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy and the Shadow of Future play a core role in explaining cooperation.

First of all, he sets five preconditions for IPD: (1) players cannot make any threat or prior commitment (2) there is no knowledge of the other players¡¦ upcoming move, as each game is simultaneous (3) the interaction among players can not be avoided (4) there is no way to change the other player's payoffs (5) the only communication allowed is through the player's own prior behavior.

Also, the concept of a discount parameter, w, which represents the degree to which the payoffs of each move are discounted relative to the previous move, is introduced. Thus, w is the weight of the next move in the future. As times go by, value tends to decrease in negative squares.

This can be represented as the sum of infinite series. The higher the value of w, the more likely the players will meet in the future. Contrarily, since 0
From this setting, Proposition (1) is derived: If the discount parameter, w is sufficiently high, there is no best strategy independent of the strategy used by the other player.

Also, Axelrod runs two computer tournaments by inviting the top game theorists, and reports that Rapoport¡¦s TFT was the best strategy. Although 15 programs in 1st tournament & 63 programs in 2nd tournament were submitted, TFT won all of them. TFT got the average score of 504.5 in 1st round & the score of 434.73 in 2nd round. Why?

He divides the reasons into 4: (1) TFT avoids unnecessary conflict by cooperating as long as the other player cooperates; this is being nice and never being the first to defect (2) TFT has no hesitation in retaliating in the face of the other's defection; that is, TFT does not wait to see if the defection was a mistake, as defection is to be punished immediately.

(3) TFT is open to forgiveness after responding to a provocation; in this way, a TFT player do not wait to reward cooperation (4) TFT has the clarity of behavior, so that the other player can adapt to TFT pattern more easily than others (TFT program length was the shortest). Thus, TFT could do well over a wide range of environments, against both nice and defection strategies.

Next, the stability of cooperation based upon TFT is discussed. He explores the relationship between a native population uniform strategy & a newcomer strategy. He assumes the existence of a native population employing strategy B & a newcomer using strategy A.

If the players interact with each other one at a time, the expected utility of the newcomer with A might be higher than the expected utility of one of the native population. In that case, A is said to invade B.

Otherwise, B is said to be collectively stable. When p is the frequency of a newcomer interacting with other newcomers, the condition of invasion by newcomers is:

(p)*EU(newcomer|newcomer)+(1-p)*EU(newcomer|native)>EU(native|native)

If p is between 0 & 1, newcomers¡¦ strategies can invade the strategy of the native population and vice versa. So, can TFT invade All D? Can All D invade TFT? Assume w = 0.9.

(p)*EU(TFT|TFT)+(1-p)*EU(TFT|All D)>EU(All D| All D)
(p)*[R/(1-w)]+(1-p)*[S+(w*P)/(1-w)]>P/(1-w)
(p)*[3/(1-0.9)]+(1-p)*[0+0.9*1/(1-0.9)]>[1/(1-0.9)]
(p)*(30)+(1-p)*(9)>10
21p+9>10
21p>1
p>1/21

(p)*EU(All D|All D)+(1-p)*EU(All D|TFT)>EU(TFT|TFT)
(p)*[P/(1-w)]+(1-p)*[T+(w*P)/(1-w)]>R/(1-w)
(p)*[1/(1-0.9)]+(1-p)*[5+0.9*1/(1-0.9)]>[3/(1-0.9]
(p)*(10)+(1-p)*(14)>30
10p+14¡V14p>30
10p+14-14p>30
-4p+14>30
-4p>16
p <-4

Thus, when the shadow of future is very strong (w = 0.9), TFT can invade All D if there is more than 1 TFT invader for every 21 All D natives. It takes so few. Also, All D cannot invade TFT when w is sufficiently high (strictly speaking, the critical value of w for TFT to be collectively stable is 2/3).

From this, he derives additional 6 Propositions. The most interesting one among them is Proposition (6)The strategies which can invade All D in a cluster with the smallest value of p are those which are maximally discriminating, such as TFT. This means that cooperation is possible even in the world of All D, as long as small clusters of discriminating invaders with TFT have a small proportion of interactions in the Hobbes state-of-nature.

More interestingly, he shows that cooperation could emerge even without friendship. Let-and-Let-Live system (i.e., the static nature of trench warfare) might be considered as the prototype that small TFT interactions invaded the strategy of All D native population on war. However, Axelrod also mentions that the stability of cooperation based upon the reciprocity can be impaired by (1) the rotation of troops (2) the artillery less dependent on reciprocity for its life than infantry in trench (3) the raids.

However, pointing out that Chapter 4 is about interaction among human beings who can evaluate the reciprocity and respond to it rationally, he argues that such understanding by the participants is not really necessary for cooperation to emerge and prove stable.

Therefore, he argues that (1) cooperation is possible without morality or foresight as shown in the relationship between crocodiles and crocodile birds (2) the patterns of unconscious responsiveness of bacteria or organism might lead to the cooperation based upon the reciprocity (3) the evolutionary process depends upon individual advantage (not benefits to whole group), which unintentionally leads to the cooperation based upon the reciprocity.

In addition, he suggests four advices on how to choose effectively under a given strategic setting: (1) Do not be envious; TFT never wins head to head, so players must realize that an IPD is not a zero-sum game (2) Do not be the first to defect so long as the future remains important, based on Proposition 1 (3) Reciprocate cooperation and defection but begin with cooperation (4) Do not be too clever; be clear about your strategy so others can figure out what you are doing. Again, TFT is the strategy which satisfies all of the advices.

Especially, five ways on how to promote cooperation is discussed in aspect of changing the strategic setting: (1) Enlarge the Shadow of the Future by making the interactions more durable and more frequent (2) Change the payoffs; The change of payoffs determines the incentives of behavior (3) Teach people to care about each other (4) Teach reciprocity; Do not forget the negative effect of All C that might spoil the other players (5) Improve recognition abilities; Accumulate the credibility of reciprocity through good history of interactions.

Finally, the social structure of cooperation is discussed. The social structure influences on how the evolution of cooperation can begin. The influence might constrain or facilitate cooperation, or make the evolutionary process of cooperation dynamic. Namely, the relationship between the social structure and the cooperation in IPD can be understood as being equal to the relationship between the culture and the institution.

As the institutional performance depends largely upon culture, so the speed and the range of the evolution of cooperation is determined greatly by the social structure such as labels, reputation, regulation, and territoriality. Fist, labels (i.e., stereotype) might decrease the importance of the benefits due to mutual cooperation. This is related closely to the debates on the distributional effect of collective interest.

Second, the importance of reputation as a bully might delay the speed of cooperation. Third, relating to regulation, the government in here is not Leviathan, but a player interacting with the governed on compliance and flexibility. In this case, the efficiency of the exchange of flexibility with compliance determines the evolutionary process of cooperation among them.

Finally, in that the territorial system (i.e., positional picture) influences the way the players interact with each other which determines the course of the evolutionary process, territoriality as the social structure matters.

Axelrod concludes: (1) Cooperation has staying power but the biggest problem is getting cooperation started (2) Ratchet effect: Cooperation is successful incrementally, as clusters of cooperation build upon clusters cooperation (3) Cooperation is a rational possibility, even without a central authority, as long as the future is sufficiently important (4) Reconciling individual interest with collective interest is possible by TFT.

Recently, Fearon (1995), Morrow (1999) and Powell (2005) argue that one of the reasons why the Pareto-inferior outcomes such as ex post costly wars have recurred is due to the commitment problem. Morrow (1999: 92) maintains, Commitment is a problem when actors' incentives change over time.

Although Axelrod and they consider the concept of time seriously, their conclusions are totally different. While they focus on explaining the cause of war in PD (i.e., In PD, one player's commitment to C can not be believed by other player), his interest is placed on explaining the cause of cooperation in PD (i.e., what matters in PD, is not unilateral commitment, but mutual learning effect by TFT).

However, Axelrod seems to be superior to them, because he might explain both war and cooperation with the level of w. But, Fearon, Morrow, and Powell might suffer from selection bias, because the commitment problem explains only wars.

References

Axelrod, Robert (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books.

Fearon, James D (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization 49 (3): 379-414.

Morrow, James D (1999). The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics. In Strategic Choice and International Relations, ed. David A. Lake and Robert Powell. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 77-114.

Poundstone, William (1992). Prisoners' Dilemma. Anchor Book.

Powell, Robert (2005). War as a Commitment Problem. International Organization (forthcoming)

The evolution is just beginning.......2005-09-10

Amidst the glowing 5-star reviews I feel the need to interject some concerns and outright criticisms of this book, although I do recommend its reading. Certainly the book provides a relatively good starting point in a very complex area, but it should not be construed as the final word on a much more complex subject. I do think that R. Axelrod provides an excellent, if at times overbearing, presentation of how game theory, specifically in the realm of an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) scenrario, can explain a number of historical as well as daily situations. He goes on to expound on some good generalizations on how people might act to inspire more cooperation and these generalizations, if implemented by people (groups, governments, etc.), might result in a more cooperative world. For this, there are good things to say. But I would caution not to create from this any utopian potential for the real world.

The `winning strategy' of TIT FOR TAT (TFT) works because it starts out `nice' but it retaliates immediately if someone else does not `play nice', too. So this is not vision of world cooperation. It is a realistic vision of maximizing cooperation under specific conditions which he covers relatively well towards the later chapters. Ultimately, the natural take away is a hopeful view of a potentially more cooperative environment, with perhaps a bit of forgetting that unkind retaliation is an integral part of his winning `cooperative' strategy.

Here are some aspects which Mr. Axelrod alludes to but somewhat minimizes, in my opinion, in their impact on TFT's potential for success in real world interactions:

a) The IPD strategies, which were submitted by experts from around the world, were submitted to computerized testing to determine which strategies `win' the most. This is based on an established point system that awards different points for different actions by two players. (This is summarized in one review already, so I will not repeat it here.) While this makes the playing of the game easy and consistent, it does not reflect the real world conditions which often exist. For example, if, in one turn, one player `defects' and the other `cooperates', the point system says the defector `wins' 5 points and the cooperator gets nothing. Are all defections `equal' in the real world? Or are some interactions far more important than others, so therefore cooperating on small things but defecting on bigger things might result in different outcomes than would ever be accounted for in the point systems used in these studies? Intuitively, a major defection may have far more significance (i.e. point value) than a minor one, but to accomplish his analysis, Axelrod's point structure is always the same.
b) Related to the above, are all joint cooperative efforts or joint defections `equal' as implied by the point values? (When two strategies cooperate, each is awarded 3 points. When each defect, they each get 1.) At the time this book was being published, an interesting `real world' example was playing out which would question this very assumption. At that time, Reagan was building up the military and the Soviet Union was `matching' the build up. You can either view this as mutual defection or mutual cooperation, depending upon whether you view cooperation as always a `positive' thing. In any event, the results of these mutual actions were NOT equal. The US had far more resources to invest in the game so each time `points' were awarded, the US actually gained more than the Soviets who eventually had to stop playing. Consistent point values simply do not account for this, unless one wants to interject additional elements not presented in Axelrod's work.
c) Related to point b), the IPD study presents things from a vantage point that each actor starts out from an equal footing and therefore the only functional question is whether one strategy consistently wins in such a way as to keep near the top of the point standings. In reality, rarely does any person or group begin interaction on an equal footing. What I am trying to raise is not the same as his discussions in Chapters 8 and 9 on the strength and growth of various strategies in a world starting out with many different strategies. In those scenarios, some strategies die out because they stop having sources of points to take from others. But what if each strategy starts out from an unequal basis, some having significantly more `capital' to expend and coupling this to a more realistic scenario where each interaction is not free, but each has a cost to the participant (somewhat like putting your bet down before you play poker - you may win or lose, but if you lose your position is not the same as when you started, it is less than when you started). In such a scenario, which is more realistic in terms of how companies, governments and even people interact, the results would be materially different. So the starting premise of Axelrod's IPD scenario and point schemes may be so well constructed as to make for interesting descriptions of some specific and even common interactions, but it may be too well constructed to be able to be extrapolated to many more complex situations.
d) Another weakness is the assumption that all defections are of the same magnitude. If, in an otherwise nice political campaign (ever seen one of those?) a small, third party candidate launches an attack ad and the attacked major party retaliates, is the retaliation equal? Or, again, does their starting point allow them to annihilate the attacker? (Since I have never seen a positive political campaign, you can interject any other similar scenario which might actually come up in real life!) The `equal points for equal actions' premise is inherently flawed. Yet this is the basis of much of the book's conclusions.
e) What is the end result of a universe where everyone uses a TFT strategy? This is only marginally considered, at best. While the issue had been in my mind throughout much of the book, it was not until fairly late that Axelrod makes clear, albeit briefly, that in any set of two player interactions, TFT will at best result in the same total number of points as the other player and, for a number of reasons, probably slightly less. In other words, the person, company, group or government using a pure TFT strategy must be happy being close to the best in whatever the interaction. Personally, I am fine with that, thank you! But to assume that everyone is and that nobody will come up with a disruptive strategy that, perhaps only for a time, garners more points but winds up putting them on top of the heap in whatever competition may be in play. If the end game is the Superbowl, being second is not gratifying. Ask Philadelphia.
f) Finally, I found some of the descriptors attached to the strategies interesting, especially in light of Axelrod's ending recommendations on cooperation. Some strategies which attempted to use planned defection as part of their strategy were labeled as `meanies' while other strategies that started their initial moves with cooperation were labeled as `nice'. I find it interesting that a `scientist' would use such descriptors to classify things given that they bring with them connotations. Even TFT could be construed as a `meanie' since one of its logical outcomes is that it cooperates once, and once only, only to defect from then on based on the other parties action. Are all non-cooperative interactions except one inherently more `nice'? This is not important in the scope of my real concerns, but I always sense a red flag rising when an otherwise objective presentation resorts to affect-linked labels to make part of its case.

All of the above is NOT to imply that I think Axelrod's work is wrong and should be thrown out. I simply felt that, unlike the rest of the glowing reviews, Axelrod's work does not go far enough and leaves some gaping holes yet to be explored. Read this book, but keep your eyes and mind open for the flaws which seem to be thinly covered with papier-mâché.

How mutual hostility can evolve into cooperation........2005-03-01

Without question, the case studies in this book have applications in biology, sociology, international relations, economics and business. The basic question put forward is, "How is it possible, that in an environment of mutual hostility where acting selfishly will lead to gain against your opponent(s), cooperative behavior between the antagonists will emerge and become the dominant long-term behavior?" It turns out that it is easy to see how such behavior can emerge, even in hostile battlefield conditions. In fact, cooperative behavior has distinct evolutionary advantages.
The solution is found within game theory, in particular the situation known as the Prisoner's Dilemma. Two people, (one and two), who jointly committed a crime are arrested for the crime and placed in separate rooms where they cannot communicate. The police interrogate him or her separately and offer each individual a deal. If they defect and testify against their comrade, they will be given a reduced sentence. In this situation, there are four possible outcomes:

1) Neither defects - both go free, each is considered to have earned a positive reward.
2) One defects and two does not - one is set free and two serves a long sentence.
3) Two defects and one does not - two is set free and one serves a long sentence.
4) One and two both defect - each serve a reduced sentence.

In the problem, reward values are assigned to the results, and typical values are

1) Both one and two are both assigned a value of +3.
2) One is assigned a value of +3 and two the value of -5.
3) Two is assigned a value of +3 and one the value of -5.
4) One and two are both assigned a value of -1.

It is clear that each prisoner wants to avoid the situation where they are the only one who serves time in jail. Therefore, if this event will only occur once, then option four will be the result and cooperation will not take place.
However, if both prisoners have the potential for a future relationship, where that relationship has the real potential for rewards for cooperation and punishments for defecting, then option one can emerge. The best demonstration of this is what took place in some sectors of the western front in the First World War. When the same units faced each other for extended periods of time, a live and let live policy emerged on both sides. Each side adopted a strategy of not engaging in lethal force, unless the other side did. When required to expend artillery ammunition to demonstrate aggressiveness to superiors, they would shoot the same target at the same time of the day. Since their firing was predictable, soldiers on the other side would know to avoid that area and in fact would often climb out of their trench to observe the explosions.
There were instances where German snipers would demonstrate their prowess by continuing to hit the same position on a wall until they made a hole. Therefore, even though superiors admonished the soldiers to continue to kill the enemy and both sides had the capability, the fact that they had a lengthy relationship allowed the cooperation to occur. These phenomena did not take place in regions where units did not face each other for extended periods.
The first chapter describes tournaments, where computer programs competed against each other by defecting or cooperating and the scoring is similar to that of the Prisoner's Dilemma already mentioned. What emerged as the most successful tactic, even when the results of the first round were incorporated into the second round, is the TIT FOR TAT. This strategy is very simple, cooperate in the first round and for each successive round, do what the opponent did in the previous one.
I was fascinated by these results and it was easy to see the obvious implications for relationships of all types. For cooperation to occur, all that is necessary is that there be the expectation of a continued relationship and the potential for future rewards/penalties. What makes it especially interesting is that no appeal to morality, ethics or any other abstract concept need be made. The behavior occurs as a consequence of an increase in the long-term gain for all parties.

Published in Journal of Recreational Mathematics, reprinted with permission.

Be good, be fair and forgive.......2005-02-16

A mathematical tale of how, if cooperation can benefit parties (which it very often does), the most profitable behaviour is initial trust (offer a hand), mirroring reciprocity (good for good, bad for bad), total forgiveness (only account for the last move) and lack of any further cleverness, calculations or speculations.
The most amazing results are that, if behaving this way in a minimally stable environment, you never benefit more than your counterpart while you always benefit most overall, that you systematically promote total cooperation, that a few pioneers can teach large groups of non-cooperative bullies and that this behaviour beautifully resists aggression.
The work of Robert Axelrod is amazing in its transparency and applicability, and enlightening in its hopeful conclusions. Thumbs up.

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Fascinating Analysis of Possibilities and Results
Excellent treatise
Remarkable , thought provoking and inspiring .

Theory of Moves
Steven J. Brams
Manufacturer: Cambridge University Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0521458676

Book Description

Steven J. Bram's Theory Of Moves, though based on the classical theory of games, proposes major changes in its rules to render it a truly dynamic theory.

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Fascinating Analysis of Possibilities and Results.......2004-08-07

Steven Brams' Theory of Moves is a fascinating publication that supplies qualitative and quantitative mathematical models used to explain the merits and deficiencies in the logic of hypothetical and anecdotal decisions of various types (economic, political, social, etc.).

Brams intermittently isolates two-party conflicts and highlights each conceivable resolution by using a 2x2 matrix that gives a variety of possibilities provided in ordered pair combinations, where the numbers range from a 1, which translates to a worst case scenario for the party concerned, to a 4, which is the best possible outcome. For instance, a (1,4) would be interpreted as a two-party game where the deciding party, who receives a 1, ends up with the theoretically worst possible outcome, leaving the opponent, which receives a 4, with the best. As another case, a (3,2) would be read as a pairing where the 3 represents a next-to-best outcome for the decision making party, whereas the 2, on the other hand, would be the next-to-worst outcome for the opponent.

Brams looks at various situations, comparing and contrasting, for instance, the fictional works of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, whose most famous character, the detective Sherlock Holmes, always comes out one step ahead of his arch nemesis, with those that display what is referred to as the Minimax Theorem, which espouses that "[i]n a two-person constant-sum game,[it] guarantees that each player can ensure at least a certain expected value, called the value of the game, that does not depend on the strategy choice of the other player". Among the works in this latter category is William Faulkner's Light in August, where a chase scene is partially deconstructed by Brams in such a way that argues that, unlike Doyle, whose protagonist is portrayed as a character with computational abilities that are superior to those of the antagonist, who never, in turn, makes the necessary adjustments to place himself or herself at an unequivocally victorious stage, Faulkner understood the mixed strategies involved in a two-person sum game where, perhaps, a decision made by the inferior might have the silver bullet effect to overcome the superior.

As a relevant case that might be brought forth, sports analysts paid special attention to the selection of players for the 1980 U.S. Olympic hockey team. After the best American players, even at the top of the National Hockey League, had previously been beaten by the Soviets time and again, the hopes of ever defeating Russia, especially in 1980, were dim. What transpired to be the Miracle on Ice was regarded by sports historians as essentially this. Though decision making officials were inclined to put together what were deemed the very best of the best, the U.S. coach used, as I recall, a counterintuitive approach by forming a team that largely consisted of players with, perhaps, less talent than the hockey elite but, nonetheless, an overall determination to win which could not be denied. In other words, the U.S. probably did not have its best team that day, but it had, more importantly, the right team.

Throughout Theory of Moves, Brams portrays various situations where diplomacy and compromise are the appropriate, realistic approaches to dealing with an opponent. For instance, if the outcome is ideologically next-to-best, it might, in reality terms, be the applicable best, especially in cases where the opponent has interests that run counter to those of the decision maker. In those particular scenes, Brams provides further outlets of analyses, expounding upon where it is not worth pursuing the attainment or maintenance of the best possible state; in discussion, Brams introduces us to magnanimity, which is a transfer of moving from what was the best possible state to the next-best possible. Magnanimity, according to Brams, is essential, especially if what was regarded as the best possible situation devolves into a worst case Status Quo, where the opposing party, over time, grows resentful and decides to rise up in hostile action.

What have been provided in these few paragraphs are only a handful of terms that Brams gives in these roughly 215 pages, for there are so many angles for the reader to look upon. In fact, the information and explanations are so thorough and detailed that once a person gains a more refined appreciation or understanding of the decision making powers or adjustments necessary for optimal outcome in game theory, he or she can apply it in life, especially when making personal decisions and effectively dealing with the dilemma that we often put 80% of our energies into what amounts to only 20% of what is really of immediate importance.

Theory of Moves is a definite must have. Quite a bit of the language is technical, but there is enough induction applied where one can draw enough analogies and parallels to what is discussed so as to relate to the points that Brams is getting across.

Excellent treatise.......2003-06-30

The next step on the journey to understanding and applying game theory. Also, check out "Game Theory at Work" by James Miller.

Remarkable , thought provoking and inspiring ........2002-05-24

To me , "Theory of Moves" (TOM) is the first academic book I have read cover to cover with great interest . I discovered this book in the course of the last semester , being one of the must reads for the game theory course I'd taken , and once I got my hands on this book I couldn't wait to have the time to read it thoroughly , a task I completed only lately .

Game theory in general and TOM in particular , have given me a new way of looking at the world surrounding me ; I feel like I understand it better than before I've learned to use this logical and rational thinking . Many things look simpler now , since the facts and principals I've learned make them comprehensible , understandable and clearer than before .

Prior to reading this book you'd have to have some background on the classical game theory . I learned this background mainly from the booklet of Frank Zagare that pretty much covered all the main basic principals of the qualitative use of the theory . Morton Davis is also a good choice for beginners , both center on the non-mathematical aspects of the theory which are used to dissect and explain the decisions of players at matters of internal politics ,international relations and everyday's life serious decisions people make .

This work represents an extension of game theory that helps to adjust it better to real life , or as Brams puts it : "The Theory of Moves brings a dynamic dimension to the classical theory which was defined as static , by postulating that players think ahead not just to the immediate consequences but also to the consequences of the other player's countermove , counter countermove and so on ... TOM extends the strategic thinking into the more distant future . "

Brams , in his book , gives all the tools needed to learn and understand everything about his fascinating theory . This effort is mostly a summation of more then two decades of trial and error , deep investigations , constant changes and improvements , and examination of a myriad of case studies .

The major concepts and issues you are going to read about and be captivated with will start with the 'Anticipation Problem' , going through 'Magnanimity' with the teasing theme - "it sometimes pays ...", 'Moving Power' , 'Order' and 'Threat power' , ending with 'Information Problems' in games such as 'Misperception' (which is enormously intriguing concept to capture) , 'Deception' and 'Omniscience' . There is also an additional chapter that was difficult for me to understand , in which Brams offers a new model of negotiations .

Each chapter is written with the well known form of introduction - theory principals - applications , in addition to a last chapter that concludes the entire book . This design is very helpful since whenever you have problems understanding the theory - you can immediately skip to the examples Brams is generous with giving - and solve all the unclear points instantly . As for the style itself , we're dealing here with a first class author that has the outstanding ability to keep you thrilled all along the reading effort , winding up asking for more ...

Book Description

A much-needed study of the ins and outs of negotiation

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