Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage

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Decent tactical discussion ruined by omissions and Celtic warfare theory.......2007-05-12

I would like to give this 2.5 stars, but 3 is too much.

As a tactical discussion this is probably preferable to Paddy Griffith's work favoring vigorous frontal assault and discounting the new firepower. However, Attack and Die has some glaring omissions that hurt it, and it also makes some assertions that don't help. There are too many technological phases and differing terrain, strategic, and logistical situations in the American Civil War to support the simple tactical absolutes that authors too often apply.

The authors' thesis is two fold: Southern armies were too aggressive; and that this was the result of Celtic heritage. On the first point it is true that the improvements in the rifle and percussion firing systems greatly improved the odds for the force on the tactical defensive. As the war progressed, earthworks further increased lethality of rifles while shielding the defender and concealing his numbers. However, this completely misses the strategic fact that it's rather hard for two opposing armies to simultaneously and indefinitely remain on the defensive since it results in stalemate. Unfortunately, as Joe Johnston proved both at Vicksburg (by failing to support Pemberton) and before Atlanta, if one cannot find an opportunity to repel the invader, the enemy can pin one's force and subdue it through siege operations. So remaining on the defensive can result in an even more demoralizing defeat without ever yielding an opportunity for victory. Preserving one's force is irrelevant if it cannot be fed or equipped because of destruction of one's territory, industry and logistical hubs. Lee, Davis, and even Bragg understood that. "Use it or lose it" applies.

As for blaming the tactical offensive of Southern armies on Celtic roots, it fails on several levels. First, one wonders what that means for Grant's armies who lost far more men in offensives...and in the end captured three separate CSA field armies for their trouble, and broke the siege of Chattanooga. Second the ethnic theory illustrates a huge flaw in the authors' (and many others') approach to comparing North and South, a simplistic New England vs. Old South view. Both North and South were heterogeneous, the North far more so. New England was far different than the Old Northwest, or the western states of the time. The differences can be seen clearly in census data for churches.

The discussion of ancient Celts, the *strategic* reasons for their defeats, the quality of their weapons and battles is very flawed and Telamon in particularly was erroneously interpreted.

Ignoring the speculative ethnic theory, what is missing in the discussion is the recognition of initiative and that when defending one's territory one must either compel the invading army to attack so that it can be defeated, or find a way to gain sufficient advantage to attack and defeat it. This was the impetus behind Lee's actions to repeatedly repel Union armies in Virginia. While the cost was high, it was probably necessary to prevent the immobilization and eventual defeat of his army. When Lee could no longer do this in 1864 he was forced to settle into a prolonged but eventually fatal siege defense.

Another important factor the authors neglected is that armies on the strategic offensive in hostile territory are at a considerable disadvantage in terms of intelligence, communications, and supply. Most of the decisive defeats North and South occurred as much for these strategic considerations as for tactical ones. Often forcing one major battle was sufficient to deplete the enemy's supplies or manpower sufficiently to end the offensive campaign even if victorious tactically.

The authors are careful to point out the general adoption of major entrenchments as a standard practice by 1864, and how this greatly changed Civil War fighting. They also illustrate how these (along with further entrenchments in the rear) became nearly impregnable to assault. Upton and other commanders had partial successes of using heavy assault columns to overwhelm sections, but the inherent resulting disorganization prevented capture of parallels to the rear. Local successes had become too difficult to exploit with large armies.

The best aspect of the book is the continual referencing of Mexican War actions and how these shaped the tactical thinking of the ACW commanders. Also useful is the lengthy discussions of period tactical manuals for the various arms.

The artillery discussion is generally correct, but the authors conspicuously fail to note the *wartime* transition from inaccurate and short ranged 6 pounder smoothbores and 12 pounder howitzers to the more accurate and longer ranged Napoleons and rifled pieces.

I was shocked at the lack of attention paid to Nathan Bedford Forrest's superb tactical skills. In fact the authors go so far as to suggest he added nothing! Perhaps they should have studied Brice's Cross Roads---a very relevant action that they entirely neglected to mention. Forrest understood initiative, momentum and concentration. Initiative and momentum are not things the authors seem to appreciate. With regard to weaponry, Forrest, like Mosby preferred two pistols for his men. This was an acknowledgement of the melee style of combat that frequently occurred in the thicketed country he operated in. He also at times effectively advanced his cannon in a more Napoleonic support because rifle range was not a factor in the dense growth. But perhaps Forrest's effective closer fighting style is in fact why they ignored his contributions.

Another irritating oversight was ignoring the decisive battle of the Vicksburg campaign, Champion Hill, and instead focusing on assaults vs. the entrenchments around the city. Champion Hill was an example of fixing an army in position and then hammering at a wing until it broke. The whole Vicksburg campaign up until the siege is one of continuous motion (initiative and momentum) never allowing the defenders to face the attacker with parity. Furthermore, after Champion Hill, at the Big Black River Grant's forces easily overran the entrenchments and forced Pemberton's army back into the city's works. Other lesser-known examples are Piedmont, Droop Mountain, Cloyd's Mountain.

Where Johnston failed is in giving up all the ground before Atlanta without once finding a point to effectively turn the Federal position or destroy a section of the army when it was most vulnerable. This is something the authors overlooked: the vulnerability of armies on the move to momentum based attacks. The defensive tactical advantage existed when positions were fixed and the defenders forces could support one another. When an army was moving it could be struck without such advantages as interior lines and defensive entrenchments. It also had less sense of where the enemy was and how strong while moving. Some famous examples of striking armies on the move include Brice's Crossroads, Mansfield, New Market, and Olustee. Each of these were Confederate victories seizing the tactical offensive from the enemy and effectively halting a Federal campaign.

Grant and Lee understood the initiative at both strategic and tactical levels. The authors (as well as McClellan and Joe Johnston) apparently do/did not. The tactical offensive could be extremely costly and against entrenched defenders it was nearly suicidal unless there were special considerations. However, it could also achieve the strategic objective and produce outsized results in various other situations. I can't recommend this work to most readers as I think it will lead them to an erroneous view of offensive operations because its conclusions are too broad and absolute.

Attack and Die.......2006-03-10

McWhiney and Jamieson argue that the South lost the Civil War because it lost too many men through frontal assaults, and that the frontal assaults were actuated by the South's aggression-prone Celtic culture.

I thought the book established effectively that the defender had the advantage in the Civil War and discussed cogently the role of current tactical thought and Mexican War experience in encouraging offensive tactics despite the changes wrought by the rifled musket.

The authors claim that when Confederate soldiers attacked they suffered more casualties than Federals did when they attacked, but do not seem to give an explanation. If this is true, and the problematic nature of exact numbers and losses in the Civil War should be acknowledged, I suspect it has to do with artillery fuses.

A major claim, that Confederate troops attacked more often than Federals did, is never, in my view, substantiated. The evidence offered, which includes accounts of Grant's attacks in 1864, actually supports the idea that neither side really learned the dangers of the tactical offensive.

I am, in particular, not convinced by any aspect of the "Celtic" theory. The evidence of a Southern preference for the offensive seems shaky, and the evidence for Southern cultural aggressiveness comes mostly from anecdotal and/or unfriendly sources. A newspaper editor ranting about war to the knife, or similar sources, shouldn't be taken as representing a culture as a whole.

Nor am I convinced that the South was "Celtic", and the argument put forward by the authors is circular -- the South fought aggressively and that proves they were Celtic because Celts are aggressive. Actually, a quick look at the surnames of Northern and Southern generals and politicians doesn't give me any sense that the North, with its Sheridan and Grant, was any less Celtic in ancestry than the South with its Davis and Stuart. Irish immigrants were more common in Northern than Southern armies, though both sides had their Irish Brigades.

The idea that the Celts were aggressive convinces me least of all. To support this claim, the authors mix primary sources and literary references, often from unfriendly and not necessarily expert authors (Caesar) and skip wildly from one cultural and historical setting to the next, giving a deep analysis of none and appearing to choose evidence tendentiously. Bannockburn, for example, appears, but Scots defensive schiltron formations do not.

The authors use overgeneralized and stereotypical "racial" arguments -- Romans, Englishmen and Yankees were "practical, materialistic, tenacious, machine-like", and Celts and Confederates were "emotional, foolhardy, romantic, undisciplined". Substitute "white" and "black" for those ethnicities and it becomes clear that this argument is oversimplified at best. The idea that the American Civil War represented "a continuation of the centuries-old conflict between Celts and Englishmen..." not only strikes me as specious, but underemphasizes slavery as a cause to a degree with which I am uncomfortable.

The idea that there's some meaningful tactical or cultural link between Pickett's Charge, say, and Vercingetorix, or for that matter Bonnie Prince Charlie, beggars my belief -- the popularity of Scott's novels notwithstanding. The book descends to its silliest level when it attempts to draw a serious parallel between a Union soldier's quite possibly wild claim of having found Union skulls in a Confederate camp and the beheading activities of the medieval Irish literary/mythological hero Cu Chulainn.

I can't recommend this as serious scholarship.

The South was TOO agressive........2005-05-20

The authors in this book point out that if the South had focused on defending itself instead of attacking Union troops during battles (not even counting the two failed invasions of the North by Lee) they might have had a chance. Yet the authors also show that the South had no choice - their generals took from West Point (and the Mexican War) all the wrong lessons - that tactical offensive would always win the day. Before rifled weapons, when the musket was the main weapon of the ground forces, men COULD get close enough to use the bayonet and use it well. I have seen studies that showed many battles during the Pre-Rifle period (American Revolution, War of 1812) was decided by the bayonet - those killed were mostly killed by the bayonet. Muskets were too ineffective.
Rifles changed all that. It changed everything but American generals, mostly those of the South, refused to change their ways. But then why didn't the people say something to make them change their ways? The authors suggest that this also had to do with the culture of the South - that they were Celtic in their ways and thoughts. So the people approved of the tactics, even when it meant defeat!
While that part of the book seems weak, most of it I can agree with. This book DOES list a ton of facts and I suggest it only for those who already know a lot about the American Civil War.

Not credible.......2003-10-10

As many other reviewers have pointed out, the "Celtic" premise is ridiculously overblown. The Army of Northern Virginia can not be compared to the Scots at Culloden in 1745.
Also, as other reviewers have pointed out, the book ignores many "big picture" issues that played into the outcome of the war. Better alternative reading would be "Two Great Rebel Armies" by McMurry or "Why the South Lost" by Hattaway and company.

ýIt was not war, it was murderý.......2003-05-30

Probably better suited for more serious students of the Civil War, "Attack and Die" by Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, provides an excellent expose' about how the Confederates "bled themselves nearly to death..." by attacking with greater frequency than their Northern counterparts. The book also presents a very compelling argument about how the use of outdated offensive tactics, learned during the Mexican War, and antiquated in the face of major technological improvements to muskets and cannon, had a devastating effect on the South.

Another interesting, and controversial, aspect of the book is the authors' conclusion that the tendency for offensive warfare was deeply rooted in Southern culture, and Celtic heritage. While the authors lacked sufficient evidence to be convincing on this point, they were far more convincing about how the advent of the rifle made bayonet attacks obsolete, the offensive use of cavalry ineffective, and entrenchments and fieldworks highly prized by Northern commanders.

Although, as the authors point out that there were good reasons for the South to adopt a defensive strategy, they elected to pursue the offensive to the detriment of their cause. Certainly, it is difficult to argue with the fact that the South lost 175,000 men during the first 27 months of the war due to their propensity for offensive action, or how they lost 97,000 men vs. 77,000 men for the North during the first twelve major battles of the war, or how Pickett's famous charge resulted in the loss of 62% of his command at Gettysburg.

It's no wonder that these tactics prompted D.H. Hill to respond with, "it was not war, it was murder," in reference to the losses the Confederates took after repeated attacks against heavily entrenched Union troops on Malvern Hill on July 1, 1862.

This book is an insightful and worthy addition to the study of Civil War strategy and tactics.

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ATTACK AND DIE: CIVIL WAR MILITARY TACTICS AND THE SOUTHERN HERITAGE
Grady; Jamieson, Perry P. McWhiney
Manufacturer: Univeristy of Alabama Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback
ASIN: B000M0QN6S

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Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage

Manufacturer: Univ of Alabama Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback
ASIN: B000I98HRG

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Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage
Grady And Perry Jamieson McWhiney
Manufacturer: Univ of Alabama Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback
ASIN: B000RZOPPY

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