Amazon.com
Noted for his excellent structural explanation of the Third Reich's political culture in The Hitler Myth, eminent historian Ian Kershaw shifts approach in this innovative biography of the Nazi tyrant. The first of a two-volume study, Hubris is far from a simple rehearsal of "great man" history, impressively exploring the historical forces that transformed a shiftless Austrian daydreamer into a dictator with immense power.
In his forthright introduction, Kershaw acknowledges that, as a committed social historian, he did not include biography in his original intellectual plans. However, his "growing preoccupation" with the structures of Nazi domination pushed him toward questions about Hitler's place and considerable authority within that system. He argues that the sources for Hitler's power must be sought not only in the dictator's actions but also (and more importantly) in the social circumstances of a nation that allowed him to overstep all institutional and moral barriers. In a comprehensive treatment of Hitler's life and times up through the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, Kershaw draws from documents recently made available from Russian archives and benefits from a rigorous source criticism that has discredited many records formerly understood to be reliable. Hubris thus supplants Alan Bullock's classic Hitler: A Study in Tyranny as the definitive account of a man who, with characteristic smugness, indicated that it was a divinely inspired history that made him: "I go with the certainty of a sleep walker along a path laid out for me by Providence." Kershaw's penetrating analysis of how such a certain path could emerge from the dire circumstances of post World War I Germany is the abiding strength of Hubris. --James Highfill
Book Description
The most powerful account of Hitler's domination of the German people through fanaticism, divisiveness, and luck. From his illegitimate birth in a small Austrian village to his fiery death in a bunker under the Reich chancellery in Berlin, Adolf Hitler left a murky trail, strewn with contradictory tales and overgrown with self-created myths. One truth prevails: the sheer scale of the evils that he unleashed on the world has made him a demonic figure without equal in this century. Ian Kershaw's Hitler brings us closer than ever before to the character of the bizarre misfit in his thirty-year ascent from a Viennese shelter for the indigent to uncontested rule over the German nation that had tried and rejected democracy in the crippling aftermath of World War I. With extraordinary vividness, Kershaw recreates the settings that made Hitler's rise possible: the virulent anti-Semitism of prewar Vienna, the crucible of a war with immense casualties, the toxic nationalism that gripped Bavaria in the 1920s, the undermining of the Weimar Republic by extremists of the Right and the Left, the hysteria that accompanied Hitler's seizure of power in 1933 and then mounted in brutal attacks by his storm troopers on Jews and others condemned as enemies of the Aryan race. In an account drawing on many previously untapped sources, Hitler metamorphoses from an obscure fantasist, a "drummer" sounding an insistent beat of hatred in Munich beer halls, to the instigator of an infamous failed putsch and, ultimately, to the leadership of a ragtag alliance of right-wing parties fused into a movement that enthralled the German people. This volume, the first of two, ends with the promulgation of the infamous Nuremberg laws that pushed German Jews to the outer fringes of society, and with the march of the German army into the Rhineland, Hitler's initial move toward the abyss of war.
Customer Reviews:
Anticipating "what Hitler wanted".......2006-12-18
This is a long and very detailed book. I knew it was not going to be easy reading when I started it. To my surprise, the first part of the book was quite compelling and not at all difficult to read. At about the halfway point of the book's nearly 600 pages of text, I got bogged down in the details of party politics and it was rough slogging. It took me several weeks to get through that part, but by the time it got to the chapter, "Working Toward the Fuhrer," my attention was once again riveted to the book. I knew very little about the personal life of Hitler and still cannot say that I know much more. Apparently nobody knew the real Hitler. But Kershaw's book certainly made me see him more as an individual rather than as a symbol of evil. I got a great deal out of this book and I have a much better understanding of how Hitler came to power. What I found most interesting about the book was the idea that everyone supposedly "knew what the Fuhrer wanted" and acted accordingly. So much of the evil of Nazi Germany was voluntary and done without being ordered to do so. People were encouraged to take actions that they "knew" Hitler would approve. It was a mindset not unlike "knowing what God would want me to do." Hitler had indeed, through propagandistic promotion, become a deity. Kershaw's biography, in conjunction with Frederic Spotts' HITLER AND THE POWER OF AESTHETICS, gives a very good idea of what life in Germany was like during Hitler's rise and why the German people found him so appealing. I'd recommend this book to anyone who wants to understand the causes of World War II. Even though the book is extremely long, none of it is superfluous. I would not cut any of it. I plan to read volume II, even though it too is quite a tome. This book is worth spending time on. Five stars.
The Ultimate Hitler Bio.......2006-10-26
This is the best portrait of Hitler we're likely ever to get -- thoroughly researched. A lot of new insights here, surprising to discover that Hitler was not 100% the thug we assumed he was. He just had others do most of the dirty work. Very convenient.
Hitler's confusing rise to power.......2006-09-25
This is the first of two books written by Ian Kershaw on Adolf Hitler. The first book proves to be far superior then the second since it dealt with the Hitler as a boy, young man, soldier and as a young politican finding himself. The first book covers the period of Hitler's life that don't get a lot attention and set the stage for the second volume that reinforced what Kershaw wrote in the first volume. Kershaw in studying Hitler's early years, adds the social, economic and family element within that sphere that surrounds his subject to create a very in-depth analysis of Hitler's early life. He also disspelled many of the myths and controveries around Hitler such as his Jewish ancestors have been dismissed or sexual deformity. His lack of initimate relationship with the opposite sex was explored, its Kershaw's belief that only female Hitler truly love in his entire life was his mother. I kind of wish Kershaw went little deeper into Hitler's shyness with initimacy and bodily contact.
Kershaw managed to portrayed a very interesting Hitler. His German nationalistic belief was one thing that began as a young man continued until his death. From this, we began to realized that Hitler's belief in the superiority of German race over all other races - including white ethnic races like the French, Poles or Russian regardless of their skin or hair colors. This laid the foundation for the Holocaust that took not only 6 million Jews but millions more of white Europeans who Hitler regards as inferior because they were not Germanic.
Another interesting aspects Kershaw bring up was Hitler as a totally charismatic leader who left the day to day running of the German Reich to his underlings. Thus he created the Fuhrer Cult where he become the receptacle of the political will of his party as his underlings will performed their tasks in order to pleased Hitler and his agenda. This system created great rivalry among his underlings, creating a divide and rule system as they all catered to Hitler and his implied wishes. This contradict many previous books on Hitler who regards him as "great man" who control all elements of the German Reich. Only when Hitler himself was directly threatened does he take manner into his own hands as the Night of the Long Knives which effectively destoryed the SA organization would show. That will probably explained why Hitler took personal control of wartime activities as the war dragged on. Outcome of the war threatened him personally.
I found the book to be quite readable and interesting in all aspects. The book does centered around Adolf Hitler and his immediate sphere of activities. I believed the book was written for readers who already have a good background on Hitler, Third Reich and upcoming World War II. Those will be the readers who will get the most out of this book since information and analysis you get will go a long way in supplementing what you know already and creating new thoughts and perceptions on Hitler.
For beginning readership, I would recommended John Toland's biography on Adolf Hitler which was written for the general masses and easy to get into despite of it size.
For all the detail, an incomplete portrait of Hitler.......2006-08-02
Kershaw's book, obviously the result of years of research, is a massive tome that incorporates some new research. However, the highly selective way in which he decides which evidence to include and which to exclude is surprising. There are also a couple of errors of fact and many highly dubious interpretations. In particular his account of the origins of Hitler's anti-Semitism is not simply questionable but wholly inadequate. A good book overall but could have been much better. A more rounded portrait, based on the very latest research, is given in Michael FitzGerald's 'Adolf Hitler: A Portrait,' published in July 2006 by Spellmount.
Good, exhaustive, and slightly skewed.......2006-07-27
You will not find any apologetics at work in this well-researched, interesting biography covering Hitler's coming to power in the ugliness of post-war Germany. Kershaw is not an admirer of his subject, seeking instead to cast a cold historian's eye toward this disastrous, chaotic time which produced a passionate, flawed, menacing personality around whom so many Germans put their trust and hope. There are the obligatory statements of atrocities toward Jews, but they are related in a general sense through Hitlers "strangeness" of perception toward these people. No attempt is made to show the deep underpinnings of the antagonisms displayed and vented by Jews and non-Jews toward each other. Nor is any reason given for this dislike of one race toward another. It is simply stated as fact to add to the damning sheet on Nazi evils. No, Hitler wasn't a nice person. And there are no evil Jews in his book. Not one. There is nothing new here, and Kershaw's constant desire to distance himself from his subject because, after all, historians cannot afford such luxuries rings a little hollow, as does his grasp of what really made Hitler the way he was. One has to assume that Hitler formed his opinions from experience, not fantasy. But Kershaw leaves it in the nether realm of untouched thoughts, never to be understood. In the general sense, however, Kershaw does give an excellent overview of the events and personalities that moved on this horrid world stage of war. His research is good. His views on Hitler are obvious and predictable. A very adequate, but not great, read.
Customer Reviews:
structural analysis.......2004-03-14
This book Focuses on the power structure of the nazi party. It doesn't reveal much about personalities or everyday life, but describes the interrelation between the beauracrats, industrialists, land owners, populace, and nazi party members. It is appropriate for anyone interested in political structures and how they are held together. It gives a fascinating look into the accumulation of power into one charismatic leader and the appointed henchmen/disciples who would literrally do anything to please the whims of their demigod, and thus gain more power for themselves, And how this monopolistic and 'anarchic' power structure ultimately led to such a terribly disfunctional outcome.
Excellent study by the best Hitler biographer.......2003-05-09
Ian Kershaw is the premier historian on Hitler and Nazi Germany and this book from the Profiles in Power series is an excellent study on the roots, success, and ultimate destruction of the "Fuehrercult." Two schools of thought are used by historians to understand the power of Nazism. "Intentionalists" see the Nazi regime as the embodiment of Hitler as the totalitarian leader. "Structuralists," however, believe the policies and, ultimately, the crimes of Nazi Germany were stumbled upon by underlings working under a loose framework rather than a deliberate program. As one would expect, Kershaw takes from both these theories to develop his comprehensive profile.
Kershaw examines Hitler's worldview of racial struggle, anti-Semitism, and living space for the German empire--how these ideas developed (Hitler's background) and how Hitler used them to create his leadership image. This Fuehrercult unified a fractional party, helped repress opposition, and created a mass following. Through Hitler's charismatic leadership the German people would be prepared to fight the Nazi fight (inevitably WWII). Kershaw also looks at the feudal-like power relations inside the Third Reich; a regime of open-ended decrees that left no "smoking gun" pointing at Hitler for the Final Solution. Finally, Kershaw examines the destruction of Hitler's power during which the irrational optimism that "Providence" (i.e. Hitler's will) would prevail was still believed by many (particularly the 'court' of Hitler's bunker). I recommend this book especially to advanced history students who want an in-depth examination of Hitler's power in a compact 230-page book. The book includes footnotes, an index, a chapter on further readings, and a chronology of events.
Unique investigation of Hitler and his rise to power........1999-04-02
It is not your typical biography of Hitler. It is a thorough examination and analysis of Hitler's rise to power. It examines how he got power, how he maintained power, how he used power, and, finally, how he lost power. Quite an interesting book. Be sure to check out other books in this "Profiles in Power" series.
Product Description
From his birth in a small Austrian village to his fiery death in a bunker under the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, this extraordinary, award-winning four-volume set is the definitive biography of the most demonic figure of the twentieth century. "The most astute assessment of Hitler's bond with the German people yet written" -Wall Street Journal -- Kershaw's two-volume biography of Adolf Hitler is unique not only in its exhaustive account of the German dictator's life and works but above all in the skill with which the author balances attention to individual moral and political responsibility with a grasp of the context and circumstances without which Hitler would have remained a nonentity. By far the best biography of the most influential individual of the century.
Product Description
From his birth in a small Austrian village to his fiery death in a bunker under the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, this extraordinary, award-winning four-volume set is the definitive biography of the most demonic figure of the twentieth century. "The most astute assessment of Hitler's bond with the German people yet written" -Wall Street Journal -- Kershaw's two-volume biography of Adolf Hitler is unique not only in its exhaustive account of the German dictator's life and works but above all in the skill with which the author balances attention to individual moral and political responsibility with a grasp of the context and circumstances without which Hitler would have remained a nonentity. By far the best biography of the most influential individual of the century.
Average customer rating:
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The Man Who Tried to Burn New York
Nat Brandt
Manufacturer: iUniverse
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Binding: Paperback
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ASIN: 1583483462 |
Book Description
In a desperate attempt to bring the North to the bargaining table and end what was to the South a losing war, Confederate spies in Canada launch a plot to burn New York City on the day after Thanksgiving in 1864. A group of rebel officers, escapees from Union prison camps who had fled to neutral Canada for safety, reach the city by train and, in disguise, take rooms in various hotels in downtown New York. They fail but only because, unknowingly, they use a chemical mixture that requires oxygen.
Smoke from the incipient fires they set is quickly discovered and the fires put out. In the dramatic search for the conspirators that follows, only one of them is caught, Robert Cobb Kennedy, a captain from Louisiana. He is tried, convicted and hanged... the last rebel executed by the North before the end of the war.
The Man Who Tried to Burn New York won the Douglas Southall Freeman History Award in 1987.
Amazon.com
Winning Ugly is the first serious book to assess NATO's first war--an 11-week bombing campaign waged against Serbia to force its troops out of Kosovo in the spring of 1999. The authors, Ivo H. Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, both of the Brookings Institution, are careful scholars, and they are generally supportive of what the United States and its allies did: "The outcome achieved in Kosovo, while hardly without its problems, represented a major improvement over what had prevailed in the region up to that point and certainly over what would have happened had NATO chosen not to intervene." Yet they are also critical of how this particular approach was formulated by policymakers, and they readily believe better results might have been achieved. In other words, the air war was a success, but a relative one; the good guys won, but--as the title implies--they won ugly.
Daalder and O'Hanlon sometimes equivocate--"Could war in Kosovo have been prevented? The answer, we believe, is maybe"--yet Winning Ugly is an excellent summary of what happened and why it happened the way it did. On the question of whether Operation Allied Force actually prevailed, something skeptics have questioned, they write: "The vast majority of Kosovars are far better off today.... [Slobodan] Milosevic unquestionably lost the war, and his defeat was overwhelming." This is a foreign-policy wonk's book, a sober analysis that tries to draw clear lessons from experience. It's not only the first book worth examining for readers interested in what happened in Kosovo; it may be the best available for some time. --John J. Miller
Book Description
After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, an international military and political presence took charge, and nearly a million refugees returned. In a new book to be published on the first anniversary of the war's end, Ivo H. Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon explore the causes, conduct, and consequences of the Kosovo conflict. Drawing on interviews with many key U.S., NATO, and allied participants, the authors analyze the diplomatic mistakes preceding the war and question NATO's strategy for averting a humanitarian crisis once the war began. They are particularly critical of the decision to use limited force for symbolic, psychological, and political purposes-a strategy that allowed the Serbs to radically alter Kosovo's ethnic balance through mass expulsion and genocide-before finally implementing a more forceful and successful strategy to end the war on NATO's terms.
The authors conclude their survey of the Kosovo crisis by examining how threats and the use of force might be manipulated in the future to achieve limited political objectives and how the conduct of such coercive diplomacy can best be managed within an alliance context.
Customer Reviews:
Typically abstruse "instant history".......2005-12-01
This book's ultimate value for future historians, I predict, will be as a guide to source documents. Its analyses are already dated and rendered anachronistic by "facts" on the ground.
Illustrative of most everything that is wrong with fact-thick, morally vacant analysis, the forest of footnotes and obsession with the minutiae of diplomacy remind one of those thick studies of the Congress of Vienna (which settled Europe for a half-century after Napoleon's defeat & exile) from the 19th century. The pro-Clinton bias is also evident despite a superficial attempt as "balance." Much analytic acrobatics is performed to portray the Clinton administation and the ineffectiveness of NATO (and the cowardice of French and German leaders is almost entirely overlooked).
The authors also miss one of the central points proved so recently: war by committee, in Beltway speak, "multilaterialism", will always fail, especially when it is coupled with an Administration which plans its actions on the basis of polls and an obsession with a tainted legacy.
Nor is William Jefferson Clinton properly criticized for enganging in an adulterous affair and then committing perjury and half dozen other felonies in an attempt to hide his illicit affair. Instead some reviewers bring to task those who held Clinton accountable for his multiple crimes involving the Lewinsky affair (a Federal judge did hold him in contempt and publically label him a perjurer).
Other reviewers laughably attempt to blame Clinton and his Administration's base incompetence upon what they partisanlly call a "frivolous impeachment" (Richard Nixon faced impeachment over the VERY SAME CRIMES! Perjury, subornation of perjury, conspiracy...yet apparently when a Liberal-left Democrat commits these crimes, in the minds of some, they aren't crimes at all; after all, the Watergate burglary was, according to one of its primary perpetrators, carried out to find proof of John Dean's wife's past as a call girl; oh well, since it involved sex, it can't be a big deal).
To blame the Republican House for doing its Constitutional duty (while congratulating the Senate on failing to do its duty) and impeaching a President who brazenly committed crimes involving the abuse of his official position is breathtaking in its supercillious desperation.
This book also demonstrates why history should not be written until a significant amount of time has passed (at least ten, more profitably at least twenty or twenty-five years): lack of perspective. In the haze and smoke of recently concluded battle, any analysis is bound to be deeply flawed--as this one is.
Time must be allowed to past, scholar must be given time to digest the facts and the primary sources. Above all, time must intervene so that the actions of the immediate past (just a few years ago) can be judged in light of the lasting consequences (and results or failure) on the ground.
Even today, while it is obviously that earlier, forceful intevention, instead of the usual futzing around with the UN and NATO, bodies designed to delay action not facilitate it, no one can seriously say what the ultimate outcome of NATO's intervention or the horrors of the Milosevic/Mladic push for a Greater Serbia empire in the Balkans will be. The claims about a push for a Greater Albania are little more than Serbophilic nonsense given the economically prostrate state of Albania (as close to a "failed" state as one can get without actually being one) and the non-existence of an Albanian military. The Macedonian Army, for example, was well on its way to crushing the Albanian terrorists when the Clinton-Albright intervention halted the police action against what were an ill-equipped, poorly led band of rag-tag terrorists. (And the idea that FYROM should have to given into Albanian demands of autonomy and lingusitic equality are quite ridiculous when juxtaposed with France's long-time refusal to grant similar rights to the Bretons, Basques and other minorities; likewise with the Spanish gov'ts similar policy toward the Catalans and their own Basques; sauce for the goose is NOT apparently sauce for the gander, a point the book completely ignores).
Just as the notorious Bomb Damage Assessment of the strategic bombing of Germany during World War 2, conducted in the immediate aftermath by the US military, led to seriously flawed conclusions that distorted military policy makers appreciation for the very significant role such bombing played in destroying Nazi Germany's ability to fight, this book too will most likely be shown to contain short-comings not yet recognized.
The "instant-book" phenomenon is not, like so much else, a product of the 24-hour, internet-wired world, but one that goes back to at least World War 2 when a slew of books came out in 1940 and 1941 by, especially, journalists purporting to provide an "inside view" of Hitler's Germany. Few of these books have much value at today because their immediacy to the events they examine and the author's consequent lack of access to critical information (especially information concealed by totalitarian and or criminal regimes)render them useless.
This book should be read, if for no other reason, as a clarion call to scholars and historians to avoid the "instant" analysis bug. Time matures and improves human beings. The same is true of historiography.
The impulse to influence future historians--as well as reap quick profits from the topical immediacy of the subject matter seems as irresistable now as it was seven decades ago.
The phenomenon still continues today during the Liberation of Iraq and the democracy aborning. The vast majority of books like this will be consigned to the "dustbin of history". If they have any staying power is usually negative: cementing one political factions version of events that helps only to muddy the waters for later, more detached and impartial analyses in the decades to come. I.e. converting one political factions biases into received wisdom which only hampers serious history.
A book of straight reportage would have been far more helpful than a thick tome cluttered with stiff, wonky prose and politically influenced goals (however superficially impartial the authors attempt to be).
Important but Incomplete.......2003-10-28
Newt Gingrich is right when he praises this book, and the international reviewers that give it 1-3 stars are also right when they point out that it is seriously incomplete and arguing from a very American point of view.
In my view, this book is essential reading together with the following four books, all of which I have favorably reviewed here at Amazon: first, Kristan Wheaton, on "The Warning Solution: Intelligent Analysis in the Age of Information Overload", Cees Wiebes, "Intelligence in Bosnia, 1992-1995", Wesley Clark, "Waging Modern War", and Eliot Cohen, "Supreme Command." These four books cover what this book does not: 1) a full explanation of why "inconvenient warning" fails time and again; 2) a full explanation of the complete inadequacy of Western intelligence in relation to historical, cultural, and current indigenous intelligence as well as small arms interdiction in lower-tier unstable regions; 3) a useful itemization of the weaknesses of both NATO and the US military in responding to unconventional challenges in tough terrain distant from the center of Europe; and 4) how "supreme command" is most often exercised without regard to intelligence.
Having said that, let me enumerate what I regard as the very positive features of this book, one that makes it central to the discussion of NATO, Air Power, and US politics as they affect "engagement."
First, the authors are to be commended for graciously but no less effectively nailing the Clinton Administration, and especially Sandy Berger, Madeline Albright, and William Cohen, for inattention and indecisiveness and a complete lack of any coherent sustainable strategy.
Second, although the author's do not stress this point beyond highlighting it in the opening sentence of the book, it comes across as a continuing theme: the entire conflict could have been resolved early on had the NATO allies had a capability to deal with *one man*, that is, Milosevic.
Third, the authors note clearly (on page 10) how there were many non-violent precursors to the violence and ensued, and that the Albanians finally concluded that only violence would get them international attention. This is a major theme within Jonathan Schell's utterly brilliant and comprehensive book, "The Unconquerable World" and one that any future Director of Central Intelligence must be held accountable for: warning in the *non-violent* stage.
Fourth, the author's, who between them have considerable expertise in defense analysis, indict the Clinton Administration for over-selling the peace negotiation efforts of Ambassador Holbrook, and the very bad campaign planning of General Clark.
Fifth, the author's document the pattern of Madame Secretary Albright, whose own book I recently reviewed along these lines, of rhetoric rather than reality--or words rather than actions with consequences. NATO bluffed while Madeline talked. Milosevic, no fool, understood all this. Albright is, however, credited with understanding that ultimately force would be needed to achieve the policy objectives.
Sixth, and this is something I learned the hard way in El Salvador, the author's very correctly make the point that such conflicts cannot be controlled with pressure on only one of the belligerents. *Both* parties to the conflict must be challenged and contained.
Seventh, the author's are helpful in pointing out that the Administration erred in failing to consider partition and independence as an option for the conflicted parties, and they emphasize that one must never under-estimate the will of any one party to achieve independence.
Eighth, and on the head of the Republicans we place this one, the authors point out that the impeachment proceedings against Bill Clinton because of his personal relations with Monica Lewinsky severely distracted and handicapped the Administration. Indeed, I recall that in all our Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) reports at the time, we had to modify all of our search strategies to include "and not Monica", so over-whelming was the trash that would come up on Bosnia and other places we were looking at, all "hits" corrupted unless we excluded the Monica factor from US foreign policy. The lesson we take from this is that impeachment, especially frivolous impeachment, has major national security consequences, and is not merely a matter for domestic consumption or impact assessment.
The book is flawed, but not grievously, for failing to have any serious treatment of intelligence. There are just four over-lapping references to CIA, and to intelligence reports, in the entire book. In as much as this book is up to the norm for beltway policy books, we conclude that until such books have the deeper coverage and understanding of intelligence shortfalls as a matter of routine, intelligence and policy in Washington DC will continue to co-exist without reform and with a deliberate choice being made by policy experts to ignore intelligence and what intelligence, properly done, can bring to the process of peacemaking.
The author's final policy recommendation merit listing, and their elaboration is a highlight of the book:
1) Interventions should occur as early as possible
2) Coercive diplomacy requires a credible threat of force
3) When force is used, military means must relate to political ends
4) Airpower alone usually cannot stop the killing in civil wars
5) The Powell Doctrine for the use of force remains valid
6) Humanitarian interventions need realistic goals
7) Exit strategies are desirable but not always essential
8) Other countries need better, more deployable militaries
9) UN authorization for intervention is highly desirable, even if it is not required
10) Russia's support is valuable in these types of operations
11) NATO works well in peace and in war but only if US leads
12) An effective foreign policy requires that the president lead with confidence.
13) The US is not a hyperpower, but rather a superpower prone to *underachievement* instead of imperial ambition (this was pre-Bush and pre-neocon)
This book stands as the core reference on NATO and Kosovo, and as one of the more helpful references on principles of intervention and foreign policy that all future presidents and their staff can learn from.
The American View.......2002-04-01
There are 724 footnotes in this book, of which 720 seem to be for English-language sources, mostly American. And the trust in American sources is complete. For example: there's a section on the Racak massacre, with no mention that some French and German papers have cast doubts on the evidence, only a 200-word quote from American observer William Walker. For example: the famous appendix to the Rambouillet accord (granting NATO troops the right to bivouac and billet and make use of any facility anywhere in Yugoslavia) was just boilerplate that would have been deleted on request -- and the backup for this revelation is interviews with an American general and an American envoy. Why didn't they ask Yugoslavs too?
Serb criminals and crimes get full coverage along with epithets like "murderous" or "cowardly" or "atavistic". But nothing on killings of Serbs before the war, and nothing in the text about the Belgrade TV station slaughter, or the cluster bombs that hit the Nis marketplace (though that's in one of the appendixes). As for the Chinese embassy attack, it was obviously inadvertent because there was no sensible reason for it. Thus irrationality connected to Serbs proves they're murderers, while irrationality connected to Americans proves they're innocent.
I found no errors in fact, and I don't expect some balanced presentation of non-American views. But a book that doesn't even note the other views, and excises facts which don't fit with the presentation of the American view, has no value except to those who want to believe that NATO was right. Others will prefer Judah's "Kosovo: War and Revenge" (which at least checked multiple sources), and Parenti's "To Kill a Nation". Or at the extreme there's Noam Chomsky's "The New Military Humanism" which is filled with anti-NATO bias ... about enough to balance the pro-NATO bias in "Winning Ugly".
Aren't We Missing the Point Here?.......2001-06-28
Daalder and O'Hanlon make the claim that the 1999 NATO air campaign against Milosevic's Serbia was a good thing, since it stopped the ethnic cleansing and left everyone in Kosovo better off than they would have been without NATO's military intervention.
Viewed through the lens of subsequent headlines, this argument becomes hard to support. The ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians by Serbs has ceased, to be replaced by similar outrages against Serbs by Kosovars. Net improvement? Nil.
Was the Kosovo air campaign justifiable as a fire-break against further bloodshed in the Balkans? The citizens of Macedonia would demur, I'm afraid.
It is hard to escape the impression that the Kosovo campaign was not only the last of the Wars for Greater Serbia, a point Daalder and O'Hanlon dance around in their conclusions, but also the first of the Wars for Greater Albania -- a point the authors utterly fail to address.
One is ultimately left with the conclusion that the authors have done a very good job of researching and arguing the wrong thesis.
A worthwhile and serious study about American leadership.......2000-08-25
This is a serious and worthwhile study which analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of American leadership and the NATO system in its first offensive war. It is particularly useful to read this book after Kaplan's The Coming Anarchy (also reviewed). Kaplan makes clear there will be a lot more destruction of humanity that will require American leadership and the use of force. Daalder and O'Hanlon make clear that we have a lot to learn if we are going to engage in campaigns like Kosovo.
Anyone who plans to advise the next Administration would be well served by reading these two books together and pondering their implications for improving American decision making and coalition leadership skills in the context of interventions in dangerous places. The clearest points in this book are Daalder and O'Hanlon's judgments that this was the right war, it was ultimately a success, airpower had a powerful but limited influence and without the threat of a land campaign and the Russian abandonment of Milosevic. In their view, airpower by itself would have failed, and that the United States has to lead for these interventions to work and the Clinton Administration consistently failed to lead the public, the Congress or our allies and because of the Clinton's Administrations prior vacillation on Saddam Hussein (loud threats, tiny attacks that ended quickly without coercing Saddam). The confused posturing of the Clinton Administration actually increased the likelihood that force would have to be used because Milosevic had no reason to believe they would actually fight to the end. Once NATO had consolidated its position and the Administration had launched the gamble of forceful coercion Daalder and O'Hanlon give Clinton and the allies high marks for realizing that NATO had to win or cease to be relevant and they stepped up to the challenge. Their critique of the Clinton Administration is decisive and thorough: "Having failed to make a public case for the use of force, the Clinton administration opted for a minimalist strategy. Its hope was that a bit of bombing would work. This was the military equivalent of the 'Hail Mary' play in football. Not only was this an irresponsible way to go to war, it also was unnecessary. A case for decisive military action-at a minimum, a robust air campaign from the war's outset--could have been made. The American public would probably have supported such a strategy given its disdain for Milosevic and memories of the Bosnian war. The tragedy of this case is that, in fearing the absence of public and congressional support, the administration embarked on the use of force lacking both. That is no basis for taking the tremendous risks that the use of force necessarily implies." (pages 224-225). This is a book worth studying and thinking about.
Book Description
Glorious panoramic photography reveals the physical legacy of Earth's past and provides a clear and original perspective on Earth as a dynamic planet. In a compelling narrative, Origins places the history of our planet in a contemporary context in which humans, like all living things, must embrace change or die.
Customer Reviews:
Plate Tectonics.......2003-06-12
This is, without doubt, the best review of plate tectonics yet published. I'm surprised that more has not been popularly written about this subject than has been.
A Unique Approach to Earth Systems Understanding.......2002-01-06
I have had the priveledge of close association with the author, Ron Redfern, throughout the writing, organization and photographic activities that support this publication. In a career of geology-based endeavors, I have never enjoyed a more unique, thorough and emminently readable portrayal of the interlocking sciences that result in the Earth's evolutionary history. This is a complex subject. However, the author has made the 700 million year trip a pleasure. The beautiful, panoramic photography, the interweaving of summary-level essays, and meticulously time-based text, lavishly supported by color illustrations, gives the reader a multi-disciplinary view of not only our planet's geologic evolution, but also its close association with meteorological events and the evolution of life. The reader will want to read and re-read this book. A wonderful adventure, every time, with new perspectives of "how things work" discovered on each page.
M.M. Thacker
Geologist
President, the La Mancha Company (consulting)
A paleo-archologist's point of view.......2001-12-20
One of many subjects treated here is the initial colonization of the New World, which has been the subject of often vitriolic scholarly debate for the past two decades. In this book Ron Redfern has managed to distill the essence of that debate in a highly readable fashion and shows how new data has dramatically altered our previous reconstructions of the timing and modes of arrival and dispersal of the first Americans. As always, the environment remains the dynamic stage upon which the prehistoric actors of antiquity operated-a theme which permeates the entire volume.
Prof. James M. Adovasio: Exec.Director: Mercyhurst Archeological Institute: Erie, PN
The Value of Redfern's Origins.......2001-09-17
I write on behalf of the curator of our C. Warren Irvin Jr Collection of Charles Darwin:
"The book has two sections which are interposed: 1. the text is exceptionally well done, and the glossary is extremely valuable for those not completely famniliar with geology and the formation of continents, etc. 2. the photography is the best that I (the curator) has ever seen in a book of this type. It in itself is worth the price of the volume. Anyone who reads this book will come away enlightened and will enjoy thinking and reviewing in his mind both words and pictures."
Average customer rating:
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Origenes/Origins: La Evolucion de los Continentes, Los Oceanos, y la Vida en Nuetro Planeta / The Evolution of Continents, Oceans and Life
Rod Redfern
Manufacturer: Ediciones Paidos Iberica
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback
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ASIN: 8449311543 |
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Origins: The Evolution of Continents, Oceans and Life
Ron Redfern
Manufacturer: Phoenix Pr
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Binding: Hardcover
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ASIN: 0304354031 |
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