The Single Mother's Book: A Practical Guide To Managing Your Children, Career, Home, Finances, And Everything Else

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Another helpful book - "On Your Own For The First Time"

Perfect for Single Moms Out There

The Single Mother's Book: A Practical Guide To Managing Your Children, Career, Home, Finances, And Everything Else
Joan Anderson
Manufacturer: Peachtree Publishers
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

Divorce | Family Relationships | Parenting & Families | Subjects | Books
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From One Single Mother to Another

Successful Single Parenting

ASIN: 1561453277

Customer Reviews:

Another helpful book - "On Your Own For The First Time".......2001-11-14

For another lifesaver for the single mom...."On Your Own For The First Time" by Jeff Bowers. For those mom's who find themselves having to do it ALL after years of having help, I found this book saved me on things I never knew and gave me great advice! What a guide, what a great tool!

Perfect for Single Moms Out There.......2001-06-24

I think that all single moms should get this book. With a baby on it's way in less than two weeks, I feel so much more at ease about bringing this baby into the world, and doing so with confidence. It's highly inclusive of financial, emotional, and time-management issues. Great guide to get you single moms started!

Book Description

After the Civil War, someone asked General Pickett why the Battle of Gettysburg had been lost: Was it Lee's error in taking the offensive, the tardiness of Ewell and Early, or Longstreet's hesitation in attacking? Pickett scratched his head and replied, "I've always thought the Yankees had something to do with it." This simple fact, writes James McPherson, has escaped a generation of historians who have looked to faulty morale, population, economics, and dissent as the causes of Confederate failure. These were all factors, he writes, but the Civil War was still a war--won by the Union army through key victories at key moments. With this brilliant review of how historians have explained the Southern defeat, McPherson opens a fascinating account by several leading historians of how the Union broke the Confederate rebellion. In every chapter, the military struggle takes center stage, as the authors reveal how battlefield decisions shaped the very forces that many scholars (putting the cart before the horse) claim determined the outcome of the war. Archer Jones examines the strategy of the two sides, showing how each had to match its military planning to political necessity. Lee raided north of the Potomac with one eye on European recognition and the other on Northern public opinion--but his inevitable retreats looked like failure to the Southern public. The North, however, developed a strategy of deep raids that was extremely effective because it served a valuable political as well as military purpose, shattering Southern morale by tearing up the interior. Gary Gallagher takes a hard look at the role of generals, narrowing his focus to the crucial triumvirate of Lee, Grant, and Sherman, who towered above the others. Lee's aggressiveness may have been costly, but he well knew the political impact of his spectacular victories; Grant and Sherman, meanwhile, were the first Union generals to fully harness Northern resources and carry out coordinated campaigns. Reid Mitchell shows how the Union's advantage in numbers was enhanced by a dedication and perseverance of federal troops that was not matched by the Confederates after their home front began to collapse. And Joseph Glatthaar examines black troops, whose role is entering the realm of national myth. In 1960, there appeared a collection of essays by major historians, entitled Why the North Won the Civil War, edited by David Donald; it is now in its twenty-sixth printing, having sold well over 100,000 copies. Why the Confederacy Lost provides a parallel volume, written by today's leading authorities. Provocatively argued and engagingly written, this work reminds us that the hard-won triumph of the North was far from inevitable.

Customer Reviews:

Poor excuse .......2007-09-15

A very weak book with articles by some good and not so good historians. Borit is so involved in Gettysburg this book seems it is the end of all battles in the Civil War. NO DEPTH.

A fresh view (at the time it was written).......2007-01-19

Loved this book. It gets beyond the myths and legends (especially surounding southern prowess)to give what it deems the most significant factors of why the south lost. Although some of these concepts have become more accepted in recent years, at the time I read this, this book was the first place I saw these ideas. As a general rule, it see's both sides as having an equal chance at the start of the war. The "advantages" the north had were actually necessary for them to have any hope of victory considering the disadvantage of being the agressor in a time when the defense had tremendous advantage, and having to subdue an entire population. The southern "advantages" of interior lines, defensive fighting and a more military culture were the only reason they had a chance and were as successful as they were. Basically, it ws even-Steven starting out, and here's why the south lost. Great book.

Find your seat and listen to the lecturers..........2002-07-25

I didn't find much new information with this text. Perhaps a novice reader would find much of this of interest. Given that these are a series of "lectures" of sorts from periodic seminars at a Gettysburg "think-tank", I found the reading to be somewhat flat - indeed, I felt like I was sitting in an auditorium listening to the respective authors "sounding-out" chapters for their next book! Glad I borrowed this from my local library!?#
Of interest however, was points made to question the often presupposed inevitability of Northern victory, as well as a recognition that the contributions of free/escaped blacks to the Union cause is attaining almost "mythical" status! A nod to political correct revisionism, perhaps?

Scholarly and informative........2000-04-13

Mr Boritt does an outstanding job in bringing together several noted historians under one roof. Each author goes to the key underlying tones and brings the reader right to the point without dragging him through endless studies of tactics and military leadership.

This work is well balanced and sheds light into a subject that is often talked about but very rarely on an educated playing field. Too often basic tactics and strategy are molded together using 20th Century research methods to explain past issues and ideals. This work does not suffer from that finite method of study.

The ". . .hard-won triumph of the North was far from inevitable." How very true! This book is a must for every Civil War bookshelf.

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WHY THE CONFEDERACY LOST.

Manufacturer: Oxford University Press,
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover
ASIN: B000GRQWUY

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What's wrong with a little speculation?

Very Speculative... and A Major Historical Error

Intellectual History at its Best

A controversial account of why Robert E. Lee lost the battle of Gettysburg

The Da Vinci Code of Gettysburg?

Lost Triumph: Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg And Why It Failed (Unabridged)
Tom Carhart
Manufacturer: audible.com
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Audio Download
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Grant and Sherman : The Friendship That Won the Civil War

Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg

ASIN: B000ANSOIC

Book Description

A fascinating narrative-and a bold new thesis in the study of the Civil War-that suggests Robert E. Lee had a heretofore undiscovered strategy at Gettysburg that, if successful, could have crushed the Union forces and changed the outcome of the war.

The Battle of Gettysburg is the pivotal moment when the Union forces repelled perhaps America's greatest commander-the brilliant Robert E. Lee, who had already thrashed a long line of Federal opponents-just as he was poised at the back door of Washington, D.C. It is the moment in which the fortunes of Lee, Lincoln, the Confederacy, and the Union hung precariously in the balance.

Conventional wisdom has held to date, almost without exception, that on the third day of the battle, Lee made one profoundly wrong decision. But how do we reconcile Lee the high-risk warrior with Lee the general who launched "Pickett's Charge," employing only a fifth of his total forces, across an open field, up a hill, against the heart of the Union defenses? Most history books have reported that Lee just had one very bad day. But there is much more to the story, which Tom Carhart addresses for the first time.

With meticulous detail and startling clarity, Carhart revisits the historic battles Lee taught at West Point and believed were the essential lessons in the art of war-the victories of Napoleon at Austerlitz, Frederick the Great at Leuthen, and Hannibal at Cannae-and reveals what they can tell us about Lee's real strategy. What Carhart finds will thrill all students of history: Lee's plan for an electrifying rear assault by Jeb Stuart that, combined with the frontal assault, could have broken the Union forces in half. Only in the final hours of the battle was the attack reversed through the daring of an unproven young general-George Armstrong Custer.

Lost Triumph will be one of the most captivating and controversial history books of the season.

Customer Reviews:

What's wrong with a little speculation?.......2007-07-19

First of all, I definitely recommend this book. I think a lot of the people giving it a bad review are being far too harsh.
I say that even though I also take issue with certain parts.

To begin with, I find it very hard to accept that Lee would not tell Longstreet that he intended to have Stuart attack the center of the Union line from the rear. I should think it would be rather vital that the commanders leading the charge be aware that once they got over the wall, they might see Stuart's cavalry approaching from the OPPOSITE direction. Otherwise, it would be a natural response in the dense smoke and confusion of battle for attacking Confederates to assume they were Union cavalry and fire upon them.

I should certainly think that Lee would be particularly sensitive to this, considering the fact that he recently lost his best subordinate, Jackson, in a similar "friendly fire" circumstance.

Since we know from his criticisms after the war that Longstreet did not know of any such plan of Lee's, the author argues that Lee did not inform Longstreet, due possibly to a combination of his irritation with Longstreet, his strong inclination for secrecy, and Lee's supposed principle that Longstreet did not need to know. Yet I simply can't believe this wouldn't fall into the category of "need to know."

I also have a problem with what I feel is the author's tendency to oversimplify when he speculates about people's motivations and thought processes.

There are other quibbles, of minor importance. Still, this book is a very worthy read. While people can (and will) argue the particulars endlessly, in the long view this theory makes a whole lot of sense. While the theory is far from proven, it is eminently worthy of serious consideration and further research by scholars and buffs.

And even if it isn't true, what's wrong with a little educated speculation? It's not as though he's suggesting that space aliens murdered JFK.

Very Speculative... and A Major Historical Error.......2007-04-30

Much material has already been presented concerning the speculative nature of much of the "evidence" presented here. Some of that speculated evidence seems simply beyond belief for Lee's normal reputation of dealing with his immediate subordinates in a normally open and his infamous non micromanager style of leadership (i.e., things like that Lee didn't tell Longstreet what the real plan was because Longstreet "didn't have a need to know" - that sounds more like Thomas Jackson's style by far - OR that Lee was miffed at Longstreet because Longstreet "had been surly" the last few days... give me a break!).

Even assuming that this was in fact "the" legitimate plan, performing it in this fashion still contained simply way too many fatal flaws.

The Northern forces were dug in and not threatening any offensive moves. And their central position - which had not been attacked at all on Day Two - was easily their strongest position. In addition it not only contained significant artillery resources but was very readily capable of being reinforced by yet even more artillery much more quickly than either flank could.

It would have made much more sense for Lee to have held his center with a relatively minor force (like he did at Chancellorsville) and overloaded his right flank and then on Day Three envelope the Northern left flank with an assault from their rear - which would have also threatened not only the Union's left rear (as would also be concurrently happening on the Union right rear flank), but would have threatened to cut off the Taneytown Pike LOC at the same time that Ewell's forces (on the other side) were slamming closed the LOC of the Baltimore Pike on the Union's right flank.

Each maneuver element would then have been able to deploy forces simultaneously into the Union rear while also "rolling up
both Union flanks towards the center. Stuarts cavalry force could then have had the option of "slamming closed the rear door" well to the east of the Federal cavalry (i.e., continuing to ride around the Federal army to the east and then to the south intercepting the Baltimore Pike ahead of the retreating / routed Union forces) OR could have been used in a "pursuit role" (once the Federal cavalry force was moved to the south in an attempt to stand-in-place and cover the withdrawing Federal army).

The plan - as given - presumes a breakthrough of the "penetration" type against the strongest point of the Union line - BEFORE the Confederate cavalry penetration into the rear of the Union forces at the breakthrough point. Much is made of the Confederate forces on the left flank rolling up the Union right towards that breakthrough point whilst the remnants of the breakthrough - not all as some have to stay in place to maintain the breakthrough opening, then turn south and start rolling up the Union line from the center towards the Union left flank anchor (Big Round Top). That plan of action presumes too many "ifs" and "maybes" and assumes no survival response by the Union forces. Even had this plan worked as orchestrated, the Union forces SOUTH of the breakthrough would have simply retreated southward along the still open Taneytown Pike Road. The Northern forces would have lost pretty much all of Howard's Corps and a major portion of Hancock's Corps... but a good part of Hancock's Corps as well as most of Sickle's Corps, Sykes' Corps, and Sedgwick's Corps would have been able to successfully extricate themselves with a withdrawal south and / or then southeast.

A double-flanking movement (as was used at the Battle of Cannae - not this type of plan)would have been more in line with the Battle of Cannae that seems to be what the the author is proposing was Lee's "real" (but "secret") plan. And I specifically refer - in my option - not to a movement that simply attacks head on the opponent's flank positions, but enveloping them with attacks simultaneously to their sides and rear areas as Jackson did at Chancellorsville.

But it was in the discussion - early in the book, Chapter four - where the author made a major error of serious significance concerning military history as regards that battle. An error that basically "blew it" for me. In fact, I was quite surprised that the reviewer who was a "historian by training" didn't immediately catch it - and catch it in horror!

First of all (but not the major point) was that the author has the figures completely wrong. I have checked a number of sources and find no major historical figures (i.e., Polybius, Livy, etc.) who reveal those particular numbers that the author uses.

The general consensus is that the Romans (who maintained very excellent and accurate records) had a total of 80,000 + troops. Approximately 10,000 troops were left behind to guard the main camp when the main Roman army deployed on the plain to face Hannibal. The deployed Roman force consisted of 55,000 Heavy Infantry (Roman Hoplites), about 9,000 Light Infantry (auxiliary units of primarily sling-throwers but also some allied archers) and 6,000 cavalry. The Carthaginian forces (deployed) consisted of 32,000 Heavy Infantry, 8,000 Light Infantry (slingers and archers), and 10,000 cavalry. At least the author DOES show the correct placement of the opposing forces - and their subsequent movements during the battle (with the exception of not reflecting the Numidian cavalry's continued pursuit of the Roman cavalry thereby allowing Hasdrubal's Carthaginian cavalry to return to the main battlefield and seal off the rear of the Roman army thereby effectively completing the full envelopment of the main Roman force.

But the MAIN error in describing the battle and inferring it being a major reason in the defeat of th Romans was the author's commentary that the Roman army was "arrayed in a rigid phalanx" ... "their front covered by rows of shields from which loomed menacing lances... "!!!!! The author immediately revealed a complete lack of understanding of the Roman army and the tactics of Roam warfare. The author was clearly confusing the Roman army and tactics with that of the Greek and Macedonian armies from CENTURIES before the Roman army developed completely DIFFERENT battle tactics...

"A phalanx is a rectangular mass military formation, usually composed entirely of heavy infantry armed with spears (note: NOT lances... lances are cavalry spears), pikes (simply longer spears - but still not "lances"), or similar weapons. The troops were disciplined to hold a line which created a nearly impenetrable forest of points to the front. The phalanx is a hallmark of ancient Greek warfare. Most authorities date the formation of the hoplite phalanx of ancient Greece to the around the 7th century BC in Sparta (about 600-700 years BEFORE the Battle of Cannae). The (Greek / Macedonian hoplite) phalanx was a formation in which the hoplites would line up in ranks, usually no less than four deep, in very close order. In this formation, the hoplites would lock their shields together, and the first few ranks of soldiers would project their spears out over the first rank of shields, to try to gain the upper hand in the battle early on and as a result, allowing for the first three or so ranks of spearmen to engage their spears against the enemy. Therefore, one might say that the phalanx was essentially a formation in which the hoplites created a mass spear and shield wall... The Greek 'doru' was a type of spear in general use in the Hellenistic world. Although accounts of its length vary, it is usually now believed to have been seven to nine feet long. It was held one-handed, the other hand holding the hoplite's aspis (shield). The front spearhead was usually a curved leaf shape, while the rear had a spike which was used to stand the spear in the ground (hence the name), as a secondary weapon if the main shaft snapped, or for the rear ranks to finish off fallen opponents as the phalanx advanced over them... "

The Macedonians then perfected the tactical idea of the phalanx roughly around 300 BC (now "only" about 500 years before the Battle of Cannae). Their improvements consisted primarily of deepening the phalanx from 4 ranks to 8 ranks - and increasing the length of the spears (not more accurately "pikes" from 7 - 9 feet to 18 feet. Additionally the Heavy Infantry phalanx was designed by the Macedonians (Phillip II and Alexander the Great) to be used primarily as a holding force while allied Light Cavalry and Light Infantry protected the flanks and the Macedonian elite Heavy Cavalry effected either an envelopment or a penetration into the opponents rear.

The Romans meanwhile (jumping forward a couple hundred years) developed "manipular or cohort" tactics to use with their specifically designed Roman legion units...

"The nature of a manipular or cohort legion is that it's inherent flexibility, initiatives at the cohort/manipular level often resulted in infantry conduct the flanking movements, something a phalanx wasn't able to do with much finesse or if a phalanx line was broken anywhere to exploit it by utilizing their sword drills to slaughter hoplites at close-order fighting... "

The Roman legions were never armed with spears (much less pikes or especially "lances"), but each hoplite carried two javelins. A military historian would - of course - immediately understand the difference in that spears or pikes are meant to be HELD and to be FOUGHT WITH during the course of the battle (unless a spear shaft breaks or a spearhead becomes embedded in which case the Greek / Macedonian hoplite would either drop back to be replaced by the next hoplite in file or in dire cases draw and use his sword. The javelin on the other hand is meant to be THROWN. And that was the Roman legion primary tactic. Approach the enemy line at a rapid but controlled pace and throw - on command - first one javelin and then - on command - the second one... and then draw the sword and wade in to the enemies now disrupted and demoralized front lines, stabbing away with their special short sword specifically designed as a stabbing / thrusting weapon rather than a slashing sword.

AT the point of reading that (according to the author) the Roman army was "arrayed in a rigid phalanx" ... and that "their front (was) covered by rows of shields from which loomed menacing lances... ", well, I lost a great deal of credibility for the author from that point on. And wondered aloud that this is a West Point graduate who I assumed (like the trained historian reviewer) has supposedly studied Roman military history along with simply the Battle of Cannae??? From that point on, most things were taken with "a grain of salt"... a BIG grain of salt!

Intellectual History at its Best.......2006-11-01

I've read several reviews prior to writing mine and it appears that many reviewers (specifically the negative ones) are missing the thrust of this book. This is a work that blends standard history - which relies on factual primary and secondary sources to attempt to establish facts on the ground - and intellectual history - which is a discipline that attempts to divine the thoughts of actors through an examination of their cultural and educational milieu combined with their actual statements.

Both disciplines are legitimate and there are historical situations where they can not be reconciled, but in many cases the two disciplines can illuminate one another to provide a foundation for a theory which answers the salient questions about key historical events. This is one such case.

To begin, many reviewers claim an entire lack of evidence for Tom Carhart's theory among the facts of the battle (to be clear, the theory is that Lee planned a three-pronged attack on Meade's positions of which Picket's Charge was only one piece and the key to its success was an attack by Stuart's cavalry, and attached units, on the rear of Meade's position both at Culp's Hill and the clump of trees on Cemetary Ridge). I'm not certain which reviewers actually read the book versus which didn't, but it is simply not true to claim there is "no" actual historical evidence of such a theory. Mr. Carhart notes it in his work several times, for example: 1. he cites Stuart's after-action review which stated that he hoped to strike the Union rear; 2. he cites Lee's reported comments to Imboden the evening of July 3 (in my mind the best evidence) in which Lee states that Picket's Charge was not supported as it ought to have been and he didn't know why when the only battlefield commander left to debrief was Stuart - therefore, Stuart would be the only source to provide the answer to why Picket's Charge wasn't "supported;" and 3. he cites McClellan's comments about Stuart's multiple firing of one gun and McClellan's statement that no one knew what Stuart was doing, though McClellan though it may have been a signal to Lee (one reviewer said this was nonsense as it had to have taken place during the artillery barrage on Cemetary Ridge and therefore Lee couldn't have heard it - interesting that such an obvious problem wouldn't occurr to McClellan, who was actually there - in other words, if McClellan thought it a signal of some kind to Lee, then the artillery barrage on Cemetary Ridge could not have been happening yet since McClellan would, actually being there, have known it couldn't be heard - therefore, logically, it had to have occurred prior to the barrage) - another negative reviwer pointed out that he tracked down McClellan as the source of this idea - also interesting since Mr. Carhart cites McClellan as his source so he shouldn't have had to track down anything - it makes me wonder if he even read the book. These three items are cited from primary sources (and there are others in the book) which are generally considered the best form of historical evidence for facts on the ground. It is true that there is a huge mass of primary material dealing with Gettysburg and that these are very small pieces of that mass - and such a fact could lead one to accuse Mr. Carhart of "cherry-picking" his facts (though I think that claim would be innaccurate based on the intellectual history portion of the work), but it is simply untrue to claim there are "no" facts cited to support his theory.

The intellectual history portion is critical to this work. It examines the theoretical aspect of General Lee and his commanders to try and divine what they planned. It is true that Lee refused, almost entirely, to discuss battles post-action - it is also true that he was notoriously close-mouthed about his plans. To expect enlightenment from Lee directly for posterity's sake is to misunderstand the man, Lee. What Mr. Carhart does is examine the professional education of Lee and compare it with his actual actions in other battles he commanded to show how that education led him to maneuver his forces in a certain way to achieve the critical military principles of war known as mass, surprise, secrecy, objective and economy of force. After that examination (which I would have liked to have been fuller since I find it the most fascinating and convincing portion of the book), he then posits the question that has been asked for 150 years (and that I have asked myself repeatedly when studying Gettysburg): "What the hell was Lee thinking?" Picket's Charge simply could not succeed AS IT WAS CARRIED OUT AND EVERYONE WOULD KNOW THAT - MOST ESPECIALLY LEE. To claim hubris as the source of the decision (as one negative reviwer does) is simply to assert your own intellectual theory in place of Mr. Carhart's - with somewhat less justification I might add. In other words, to claim that you know what Lee was thinking without the benefit of a developed theory of Lee's psyche based on his education, culture and other actions. Mr. Carhart does posit a theory of Lee's intentions based on just such an examination - and it rings true. IF Lee's plan was such as Mr. Carhart posits (and while I am unable to be dogmatic about it, I am convinced that he is correct), then the question about what was Lee thinking when he ordered Picket's Charge is answered, and answered in a way that fits with what we know of Lee's psyche based on his education, culture, training and other actions during the war. In other words, Mr. Carhart has developed an intellectual history justification that makes sense and when that is added to the primary historical sources he cites, then the theory breathes. It is neither counterfactual, evidence-poor nor badly-argued. Like all theories, it does not demand assent, but it appears to me, from the evidence, that it is strongly supported. So, in contravention of one of the other reviwers, Mr. McPherson should have no shame in providing a forward - rather he simply acknowledged the quality work of a fellow historian done well.

In conclusion, Mr. Carhart has written a fine piece of intellectual and traditional history that sheds new and convincing light on one of the most inexplicable decisions made by any commander in history. I strongly urge readers to read it themselves and think it through.

Final note: I'm an historian by training and a lawyer by profession so examining historical evidence is not out of my area of expertise.

Kelly Whiting

A controversial account of why Robert E. Lee lost the battle of Gettysburg.......2006-09-23

Was it Lee's fault? Tom Carhart a West Point graduate ponders this question as he looks at Gettysburg. Along the way we read brief accounts of famous battles Lee studied at West Point. Especially important are Cannae in 216 BC won by Hannibal against Rome; Leuthen in 1756 which was Frederick the Great's best battle and several Napoleonic battles. Napoleon was the beau ideal of the great soldier in nineteenth century military study.
The book has a short introduction by noted scholar James McPherson which gives it respectable cache with this reader. Carhart's thesis is
that Lee wanted Longstreet and Ewell to attack both wings of the Union Army on Cemetery Ridge on July 3rd. The key to victory was to be JEB
Stuart's cavalry assault from the rear on Culp's Hill. However, these
plans were stopped cold by the Union victory on the East Cavalry Field
battleground where the intrepid George Armstrong Custer led his Wolverines to victory. Picket's Charge was also a disaster.
Along the way we are given a brief sketch of RE Lee's career and several Civl War battles.
Carhart has a vivid writing style but I would want to read more before accepting his theory. It does sound plausible.

The Da Vinci Code of Gettysburg?.......2006-08-12

The Da Vinci Code was a work of fiction based on theories that had been kicked around long before, and it displayed little depth or knowledge of theology or history -- especially of the history of the Holy Grail, which made its first bow in literature in the late twelfth century (despite copious vain attempts to link it, however tenuously, with more ancient myths). Yet the Da Vinci Code was apparently a good read and a runaway success that has changed the way people think, even if what they think is provably inaccurate.

LOST TRIUMPH doesn't sink to those depths, but it does present an interesting alternative to the battle of Gettysburg via speculation. Like the Da Vinci Code, the author's idea has been batted around before (I read another book with the same theory before I read LT). Unlike the Da Vinci Code, it has some basis in history.

The great question was always, "What was Lee thinking?" While I have read defenders of Pickett's charge (if only Longstreet had gone when he was told!) But when Longstreet didn't go, and didn't go, and didn't go, why didn't Lee scrub the mission -- or sack a subordinate who refused to follow orders? And did Longstreet finally charge those men to their deaths out of spite, just to rub Lee's face in it? LOST TRIUMPH is an attempt, albeit speculative, to address these more than 150-year-old questions and provide answers.

The book's largest failure is structural. It might have been better if the author had taken the pedantic fact-cum-fiction approach of THE EDUCATION OF JULIUS CAESAR. "The Education of Robert E. Lee: and How it Lost Gettysburg." He does a good job of describing Lee's education at West Point, and his cultural milieu, for beginners. He even points to some of Lee's favorite reads. He takes us through Mexico with Lee, and shows the young Lee's courage and resource (which would come into play when he was given command of an army that was always smaller than his opponent's, and with less materiel).

The author takes his time getting to Gettysburg. His ideas are speculative, but so is much of accepted history. What he lacks in primary documentation, he makes up for in imagination. Other reviewers have compared "facts" presented here with "facts" presented by the likes of Shelby Foote -- but Foote cannot be relied upon, either. Foote apparently made up the story that the Confederates went to Gettysburg to look for shoes, which is often presented as known fact, although that story could be the poster child for undocumented speculation.

The premise of the book (and the author gets around to it about like I have in this review, after a lot of other stuff) is that Lee sent Stuart -- who had circled the Union army twice -- around the Union army for rear action simultaneous with Longstreet's frontal advance. Stuart's rear action and the frontal assault were meant to divide the Yanks. Wow. This is a sweeping idea (and, as I said before, hardly new). Is it true? I don't know. Is it plausible? Lee was an audacious commander, and though his generalship has been under fire by revisionists, that tide will subside. It's certainly a plausible idea, and if Lee didn't have it, he should have. Unfortunately, Gens. Stuart and Lee are both deceased, so we can't ask them. Any attempt to read their intentions will contain some degree of projection.

So, why did the dual assault fail? The frontal assault failed because of Longstreet's intransigence, and Union movement during day three of the battle. The rear assault failed because Stuart was stopped dead by -- George Armstrong Custer, who was later felled in another famous battle, that of the Little Bighorn. Custer has been much maligned (not always unfairly) but the premise that Custer saved the union at Gettysburg is tough meat for some readers to chew, because of the baggage of their own cultural milieu.

That explains why Lee didn't scrub the mission when Longstreet failed him: Stuart's ball was already in play and without the frontal assault, the rear action was rendered pointless.

But readers don't have to worry about Custer saving the Union. That point, which was actually implied by the previous book I read on the subject, is not debatable. Gettysburg made a lot of noise, but Vicksburg, where the Yanks actually did divide the Confederacy, was where the Confederacy was lost. The Confederacy would have survived Gettysburg (especially with Meade in command). Vicksburg started the gray sand of the Confederacy leaking out of the hourglass. It was only a matter of time, unless public war-weariness up north could be exploited the way it is by America's enemies today.

LT should be read with some background to the battle. It's not a starter's kit. A solid, general (for Da Vinci Code readers, I mean "not specific") history of the battle should be read beforehand, and the accepted facts absorbed. It probably should not be read by experts, either, since, judging by the reviews, this sort of book gets their nose out of joint.

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Why The Confederacy Lost
Gabor S. Boritt (editor)
Manufacturer: Oxford University Press, USA
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback
ASIN: B000OKFFJC

Average customer rating:

Why the Confederacy Lost
Gabor S. Ed Boritt
Manufacturer: Oxford University Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover
ASIN: B000NPTCNS

Book Description

Surrounded on three sides by three major rivers, with both upland and lowland forest and with dramatic topographic relief in the unglaciated Shawnee Hills, southern Illinois offers a wide variety of habitats and birds unusual to Illinois and the Midwest in general.

W. Douglas Robinson documents current knowledge of the birds of southern Illinois by surveying both the published literature on the subject and the unpublished field notes of active observers, field notes summarizing many important observations that have never before been easily available.

Compared with studies in central and northern Illinois, there have been few active field observers in the south; yet the contributions of those who have worked in southern Illinois have been considerable. Robinson displays their efforts convincingly in this book. And to stimulate further research, Robinson points out gaps in current knowledge. Throughout the species accounts, in particular, he discusses what is missing or unclear regarding the status and migratory dates of birds.

Designed to help bird watchers in the field and at home discover the significance of their observations, this book includes information on early arrival and late departure dates of migrants, the highest reported single-day counts in each season, and records of all vagrants. In addition, Robinson includes maps and guides to some of the best birding areas in the region to encourage birders and others to explore the many birding and scenic attractions in southern Illinois.

Robinson has produced a definitive reference for ornithologists and amateur bird watchers alike, conservation and government agencies, college students in biology, and future researchers who wish to determine the status and abundance of southern Illinois birds.

Customer Reviews:

Great Volume.......2004-12-28

This is a great volume and so very helpful, but someone needs to update it!

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